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INTRODUCTION
The 1999 Kosovo crisis epitomises some of the most vivid debates in con-
temporary international law : how does one protect the fundamental
human rights of a population against its own government? How does one
react to claims for self-determination by minorities striving to achieve inde-
pendence? When does a dispute between a government and a sub-state
group cease to be an internal affair?
This article proposes to focus on the political aspects of the international
response to the crisis. It does not broach the issue of the use of force by
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Rather, it endeavours to paint a
legal analysis of the positions adopted by the states that reacted to the
crisis, the arguments they invoked, and the kind of solution they promoted.
The way international law was referred to by the other actors in the con-
flict, namely the Kosovo Albanians and the Yugoslav/Serbian authorities,
will also be considered. The central concern will be to determine, in the
light of the Kosovo crisis, whether international law provides any
guidelines for the resolution of a conflict between a culturally distinct
group within a state, claiming independence or a special status, and a gov-
ernment which responds to such demands with repression.
Two concepts are of central importance within the ambit of this discus-
sion : self-determination of peoples and minority rights. Both of these con-
cepts remain highly controversial (1). It is not proposed to describe in
(1) On self-determination of peoples, see inter alia, J. CRAWFORD (ed.), The Rights of Peoples,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988; C. ToMUSCHAT (ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination, Dor-
drecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993; C. BROLMANN, R. LEFEBER and M. ZIECK (eds),
Peoples and Minorities in International Law, Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993;
A. CASSESE, Self-Determination of Peoples . A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1995; H. HANNUM, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination, The Accomodation
of Conflicting Rights, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996 (revised edition);
T. CHRISTAKIS, Le droit d l'auto-ditermination en dehors des situations de dicolonisation, Paris, La
Documentation Frangaise, 1999. On international protection of minorities, see inter alia,
P. THORNBERRY, International Law and the Rights of Minorities, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1991; 1.0. BOKATOLA, L'Organisation des Nations Unies et la protection des minoritis,
Brussels, Bruylant, 1992; J. PACKER and K. MYNTTI (eds), The Protection of Ethnic and
Linguistic Minorities in Europe, Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 1993;
A. PHILLIPs and A. ROSAS (eds), Universal Minority Rights, Abo Akademi University Institute
for Human Rights/Minority Rights Group, Turku/Abo and London, 1995; A. FENET et al., Le
droit et les minoritis, Analyses et textes, Brussels, Bruylant, 1995; S. PIERRP-CAPS, La Multina-
tion, Iavenir des minoritis en Europe centrale et orientale, Paris, 0. Jacob, 1995; N. ROULAND,
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detail the theoretical debates that surround these notions. Only those
aspects which cast some light on the Kosovo episode will be touched upon.
Indeed, the relationship between the issues of self-determination and
minority protection will appear like a leitmotiv at various stages in the dis-
cussion.
The region of Kosovo (2) is located in the south of the Republic of Ser-
bia, one of the two constitutive units of the FRY, the other being the
Republic of Montenegro. According to the 1991 population census, the
province had around 2 million inhabitants (3). Between 80 % and 90 %
were ethnic Albanians, while most of the others were Serbs (8-10 %) (4).
Kosovo has a powerful symbolic importance in the tradition of both com-
munities. Nicknamed the 'Serbian Jerusalem', it was the heartland of the
medieval Serbian kingdom, and the place of the 1389 mythical defeat
against the Ottoman Sultan (5). As for Albanians, they claim to be des-
cendants of the Illyrians, who inhabited the land in Antiquity. And in the
nineteenth century, the most important events of the Albanian national
movement took place in Kosovo (6).
The region was part of the Ottoman Empire until the first Balkan war
(1912), when it was invaded by Serbia, independent since 1878. The Lon-
don conference confirmed the incorporation of Kosovo into Serbia and
S. PIERRP-CAPS, J. POUMARkDE, Droits des minoritis et des peuples autochtones, Paris, P.U.F.,
1996; N. LEVRAT (ed.) Minoritis et Organisation de l'Etat, Brussels, Bruylant, 1998.
(2) The name of the region itself is a sensitive issue : the Serbs use the term Kosovo i
Metohija, shortened to Ko8met, while the Albanians call it Kosova. In the 1946 Constitution of
the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the region was referred to under the name Kosovo
and Metohija. When, in 1969, from 'autonomous region' (oblast), it was promoted to the status
of 'autonomous province', its name became simply 'Kosovo' The 28 September 1990 Serbian
Constitution, which deprived the region of its autonomy, restored the name 'Kosovo and
Metohija'. See Vojin DIMITRIJEVIC, s The 1974 Constitution as a Factor in the Collapse of
Yugoslavia or as a Sign of Decaying Totalitarianism ), EUI Working Papers, Robert Schuman
Centre n" 94/9, p. 6, note 6.
(3) H. POULTON, The Balkans . Minorities and States in conflict, London, MRG Publications,
1993, p. 57.
(4) Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Special report on
minorities, periodic report submitted by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, E/CN.4/1997/9, § 31. For details about population statistics demography, see infra,
note 39.
(5) According to No6l Malcolm, historians have shown that Serbs and Albanians were fighting
together as allies, maybe even on both sides of the battle. In fact, this was not a fight between
two national groups, but rather of Christian lords defending their estate against the Ottoman
expansion. The idea that this episode reflects the essence of the 'Serbian identity' is a product
of the nineteenth century. See N. MALCOLM, Kosovo, A Short History, London, Papermac, 1998,
Chapter 4, <<The Battle and the Myth s, pp. 58-80; C. LUTARD, Giopolitique de la Serbie-Mon-
tindgro, Brussels, Complexe, 1998, p. 29.
(6) N. MALCOLM, supra note 5, p. 217. See more generally A. PAVKOVIC, ((Kosovo : A Land of
Conflicting Myths ), in K. DREZOV, B. GOKAY, D. KosTovIcovA (eds), Kosovo, Myths, Conflict
and War, Keele European Research Centre, Southeast Europe Series, 1999, pp. 4-11. The author
analyses the way both Serbs and Albanians use myths about their national history to justify
their claims to the province. See also M. Dooo, a National Truths and disinformation in
Albanian-Kosovar Historiography)), in G. DuiJZINGS, D. JANJIC, S. MALIQI (eds), Kosovo/Kosova,
Confrontation or Coexistence, Peace Research Centre, University of Nijmegen, 1996, pp. 34-45.
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when, in 1918, Yugoslavia was founded as the 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes', Kosovo was regarded as an integral part of Serbia. Under
the leadership of Marshall Tito, the People's Republic of Yugoslavia,
proclaimed in 1945, was organised as a federal state composed of six
republics : Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Serbia. The latter republic included two autonomous regions : Voi-
jvodina and Kosovo. The new Constitution of 1974 upgraded those two
regions to the status of autonomous provinces. While remaining nominally
parts of Serbia, their status was in fact very close to that of the six
republics (7). By exploiting the resentment of the Serbs in relation to
Kosovo, in particular the perception of 'minorisation' vis-d-vis the
Albanians, Slobodan Milosevic turned himself into a nationalist leader and
reached the head of the Serbian Communist League in 1987. In 1989, the
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted several amendments to the
Serbian Constitution, which considerably reduced the autonomy of Kosovo
and Voijvodina. The demotion of the status of the province triggered a
wave of protests in Kosovo, which resulted in violent confrontations
between Albanian demonstrators and the police. On July 2, Albanian mem-
bers of the Provincial Assembly, barred from entering the parliament build-
ing, gathered outside it and declared Kosovo an <<independent and equal
constituent unit)) within the Yugoslav Federation. In reaction, the Serbian
authorities dissolved the provincial assembly and government, thus remov-
ing the last elements of Kosovo's autonomy. A state of emergency was
declared and the army was sent into the province (8).
At this stage, the objective of the Kosovar Albanian leadership was still
to obtain the status of fully-fledged Republic within Yugoslavia, as
emerges from the text of the so-called 'Constitutional Declaration of the
Republic of Kosovo', adopted in Kaganik by two thirds of the deputies of
the dissolved Assembly of Kosovo (9). However given the general evolution
occurring in the rest of Yugoslavia, this position was soon revised. In 1990,
the first free multiparty elections held in the republics led to the victory
of pro-independence parties in Slovenia and Croatia (10). The two republics
proclaimed their independence on June 25, 1991 (11) (followed a few
months later by Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and hostilities broke
(7) See, inter alia, Vojin DIMITRIJEVIC, supra note 2, p. 17.
(8) For details about the progressive suppression of Kosovo's autonomy and the Albanian
reactions to it, see D. KosTovIcovA, Parallel Worlds : Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of
Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996, Research Paper, Keele European Research Centre, August 1996,
pp. 23-30 and C. DICKEHAGE, Questione nazionale e crisi della Jugoslavia : L'organizzazione
politica degli Albanesi del Kosova, Tesi de Laurea in Storia e Istituzioni dell'Europe Orientale,
Universith di Bologna, 1997 (unpublished), pp. 85-93.
(9) D. KosTovicovA, supra note 8, p. 31.
(10) For details about these elections, see S.L. WOODWARD, Balkan Tragedy, Chaos and Dis-
solution after the Cold War, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1995, pp. 117-126.
(11) Idem, p. 146.
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out. In this context, Albanian former deputies decided to hold a referen-
dum on the independence of Kosovo which, they claimed, gained 99.87 %
approval by 87.01 % of all eligible voters in Kosovo (12). Accordingly, on
October 19, 1991, the 'Kosovo Parliament' amended the Kaganik Constitu-
tion and declared 'Kosova' as a 'sovereign and independent State' (13).
The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) won the majority vote in the
clandestine elections organised in May 1992, and its leader, Ibrahim
Rugova, became 'President' of the unrecognised 'Republic of Kosova'. He
called the Albanian population to peaceful resistance, based on systematic
denial of the legitimacy of Serbian authority. The Albanian leadership set
up a parallel society, providing most aspects of public services, while Ser-
bian officials launched a policy of 'reserbianisation of Kosovo' (14). Many
Albanian public servants resigned from their posts, while the others were
dismissed, and they were all replaced by Serbs. Systematic discrimination
and numerous human rights violations perpetrated by Serbian police and
security services against ethnic Albanians were reported, including
arbitrary arrests, torture, harassment and house searches (15).
The LDK continued to preach passive resistance while seeking interna-
tional support for its cause, assuring the Albanian population that the
'international community' would impose a solution for Kosovo within the
framework of a comprehensive peace settlement for the former Yugoslavia.
Therefore, that the Kosovo issue was not dealt with in the Dayton Agree-
ment compounded tensions and resulted in the radicalisation of a part of
the Albanian population. Support for the moderate factions declined (16).
From 1996, the 'Kosovo Liberation Army' (KLA) began small-scale armed
attacks (17). The Serbian authorities reacted brutally. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations denounced the # killings of civilians [...] the
mass displacement of civilian population, the extensive destruction of
villages and means of livelihood # by federal and Serbian government for-
ces. He stressed that, ((while the victims of the conflict [were] over-
whelmingly ethnic Albanians s, Serbs also suffered kidnappings and killings
(12) Keesing's Record of World Events, 1991, p. 38511 (hereinafter Keesing's).
(13) D. KosTovIcovA, supra note 8, p. 31.
(14) M. Roux, <Le calme trompeur du Kosovo ), in J. RUPNIK (ed.), Les Balkans, paysage
apris la bataille, Complexe, Brussels, 1996, pp. 107-122. See also the Special Report on minorities,
supra note 4, § 43 and D. KosTOVICOvA, supra note 8, pp. 32-36.
(15) Special report on minorities, supra note 4, § 39. See also D.L. PHILLIPS, ( Comprehensive
Peace in the Balkans : the Kosovo Question *, in H.R.Q., 1996, vol. 18, p. 821-832 and references
cited, D. KosTovICovA, supra note 8, pp. 49-55.
(16) Note that since 1991, the position of the LDK is also in favour of independence for
Kosovo. Its disagreement with the KLA lies in the means to be used to achieve this aim : peace-
ful resistance or armed action. See T. JUDAH, << The Growing-Pains. The Growth of the Kosovo
Liberation Army #, in Kosovo, myths, conflicts and war, supra note 6, pp. 21-25.
(17) The KLA made its first public apparition in November 1997. On the origin and growth
of the KLA, see inter alia T. JUDAH, supra note 16; J. PETTIFER, <<The Kosovo Liberation
Army - the Myth of Origin s, in Kosovo, myths, conflict and war, supra note 6, pp. 26-30 and M.-
F. ALLAIN, a Visages multiples de l'armee de lombre s, Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1998.
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by Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units (18). On March 31 1998, the UN
Security Council, in Resolution 1160 (1998), condemned < the use of
excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful
demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the KLA #.
However, the fighting between Yugoslav security forces and Albanian
armed groups intensified, raising fears of an extension of the tension over
the borders. The number of refugees and displaced persons continued to
increase (19). On 23 September, in Resolution 1199 (1998), the Security
Council affirmed that ((the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo con-
stitutes a threat to peace s and called for a cease-fire (20). In October,
under the threat of air strikes by NATO, the Yugoslav President Milosevic
reached an accord with the US Special Envoy, Richard Holbrooke. He
committed himself to withdraw his troops from Kosovo and to allow the
creation of a 2,000 strong unarmed verifiers mission by the Organisation for
the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to oversee compliance
with the Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998) (21). However, from the
end of December, the violations of the cease-fire multiplied, the acts of
violence on both sides increased dramatically, culminating in the massacre
of 45 ethnic Albanians in the village of Racak, in January 1999 (22). After
renewed threats by NATO, the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities consented
to start negotiations at Rambouillet, France, on February 6, with repre-
sentatives of the Kosovar Albanians (23). The two delegations were
(18) Report of the UN Secretary- General prepared pursuant to resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199
(1998) of the Security Council, 3 October 1998, S/1998/912, §§ 7-10.
(19) Keesing's, May 1998, p. 42301; Report of the UN Secretary-General prepared pursuant to
resolution 1160 (1998), 4 June 1998, 8/1998/470, esp. §§ 18-20; 2 July 1998, S/1998/608, § 13;
5 August 1998, 8/1998/712, §§ 11-12; 4 September 1998, S/1998/834.
(20) The qualification of #threat to peace and security in the region ) was reiterated in
Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998), 24 October 1998.
(21) Keesing's, October 1998, p. 42580. This was complemented by an agreement with NATO
providing for the establishment of an air verification mission over Kosovo. See the Report of the
UN Secretary -General, 12 November 1998, S/1998/1068, § 6.
(22) Report of the UN Secretary-General, 30 January 1999. S/1999/99, esp. §§ 3-16 and 25-31.
(23) In fact, throughout the year of 1998, the Serbian Government issued several public
invitations to negotiate to representatives of all 'national communities' in Kosovo, including the
Kosovar Albanian community. However, this invitation was reliant on the condition that the
question of the status of Kosovo be discussed only in the framework of the Republic of Serbia.
The Kosovar Albanian representatives interpreted this requirement as a precondition and there-
fore did not attend the offered talks. They made their willingness to enter into dialogue clear,
but only with the government of the FRY (as opposed to Serbia), and in the presence of a third
party. However, the Serbian Government opposed the participation of an outside representative.
( Report of the European Union on the situation in Kosovo s, 21 April 1998, § 2 and 5 and
(Information on the situation in Kosovo and on measures taken by the OSCE s, 20 April 1998,
§ 4, Annex I and II to the Report of the UN Secretary- General, S/1998/361, 30 April 1998). In addi-
tion, the rise of the KLA on the Albanian political scene created new difficulties for the organisa-
tion of negotiations, since KLA leaders contested the dominance of the LDK in the negotiating
team and demanded to be part of it. s With sharp divisions within the Kosovo Albanian ranks s,
stated the report of the OSCE in October 1998, ( the problem of just who represents them will
likely continue and the prospects of a ceasefire called by KLA and the Serbian authorities
currrently appear remote)) (s Information on the situation in Kosovo and measures taken by the
OSCE s, Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General, 3 October 1998, S/1998/912. See also the
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required to negotiate an agreement drafted by the 'Contact Group' (24),
providing for substantial autonomy for Kosovo within the FRY and super-
vised by an international military presence (25). Three weeks after the end
of the conference, the Albanian delegation decided to sign the draft peace
deal, while the Yugoslav/Serbian representatives continued to refuse it. On
March 24, NATO began a bombing campaign against the FRY. The
Yugoslav President launched a massive offensive in Kosovo against the
Albanian population, driving over eight hundred thousand Kosovars out of
the country in ten weeks (26). The conflict ended with the acceptance by
the Serbian Parliament and President Milosevic, on June 3, of a peace deal
providing for the deployment of a military and civil international force in
Kosovo, under UN auspices (27). Seven days later, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1244 (1999), authorising < member States and relevant
international organisations to establish the international security presence
in Kosovo >> and entrusted the UN Secretary-General with the organisation
of a United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
The Yugoslav and Serbian authorities withdrew all their forces from the
province, while the NATO countries started the deployment of a security
force (KFOR) of 50,000 troops, and the UN began to set up the Interim
Administration Mission.
The following analysis of the international reaction to the Kosovo crisis
is divided into three sections. Firstly, the legal position of the parties in
conflict and the response of the states involved in the crisis are examined.
The legal arguments deployed by each side are clearly discernible :
Albanian leaders were claiming the status of a people entitled to self-deter-
mination, and, hence, to independence. Yugoslav authorities responded
that they were 'only' a national minority and that the issue was an internal
affair of the Serbian Republic. As for third-party states, they have insisted
from the beginnings of the Yugoslav crisis that Kosovo should be granted
an autonomous status. However, they conspicuously avoided reference to
self-determination or to minority protection. It is not clear then, whether
preceding reports of the OSCE Annex I to the Report of the Secretary-General, 5 August 1998,
§ 14, 8/1998/712; 21 September 1998, § 7, S/1998/834). Note that an agreement had been signed
by the FRY's President, S. Milosevic and the LDK's leader, Dr Rugova in September 1996, on
the reintegration in the education system of Albanian students and teachers (C. LUTARD, Supra
note 5, p. 82). But this agreement was never implemented, in part because of the strong hostility
of Kosovo Serbs towards it (see, in particular, the Report of the Secretary-General, 4 June 1998,
8/1998/470, §44).
(24) The Contact Group was formed in 1994 to co-ordinate the action of a group of states
in their search for a solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It includes repre-
sentatives of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy and the Russian
Federation (M. Roux, Le Kosovo, Dix cles pour comprendre, Paris, La D6couverte, 1999, p. 50,
note 1).
(25) Keesings, January 1999, pp. 42805-806.
(26) Le Monde, 5 June 1999.
(27) The Guardian, 4 June 1999.
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autonomy for Kosovo was supported as a matter of right or as a necessary
means to end the violence (I).
This latter question is developed further in the second part. If one tries
to find legal grounds for autonomy in international law, it seems that one
will inevitably return to the notions of self-determination or minority
protection. Yet, in the Kosovo crisis, third-party states did not refer to
either of these, but rather to security and humanitarian considerations,
when calling on Serbia to grant autonomy to the province. In order to
assess whether this attitude could be construed as entailing the acceptance
by states that a government could be legally required to grant autonomy
to a sub-state community as a means to end an internal conflict, the
attitude adopted by the same group of states towards comparable conflicts
will be looked at (II).
In any case, autonomy systems can take various forms, depending on the
circumstances. Nonetheless, it is submitted that international law condi-
tions the substance of autonomy regimes to a certain extent. Accordingly,
the third part of this paper will return to the Kosovo issue, examining the
plan negotiated at Rambouillet in the light of international law. Finally,
some brief observations about the status of Kosovo resulting from the
arrangement implemented after the NATO bombings, will be put forward
(III).
Since a substantial part of this work consists of discussion of the posi-
tions formulated by the protagonists in the crisis, mainly third-party
states, it will be based to a large extent on statements made by state offi-
cials or adopted by international organisations. The determination of the
legal implications of such documents is not an easy task, for they are
usually dependent on a variety of political factors. As a matter of fact, the
line between international law and politics is a hazy one. However, a care-
ful review of statements made on different occasions, by different actors,
on the same issue, sometimes endowed with a legal value, sometimes not,
seems to be the only way to ascertain the evolution of international law in
practice and the possible emergence of new customary norms. From
another perspective, it also reflects the way international law is used to
promote political goals and the way politics influence the shaping of
law (28).
(28) On the relationship between law and politics, see, in particular, M. KOSKENNIEMI, From
Apology to Utopia, The Structure of International Legal Argument, Helsinki Finnish Lawyers Pub-
lishing Company, 1989; J. CAILLOSSE, s Droit et politique : vieilles lunes, nouveaux champs s,
Droit et Socidtd, n" 26, 1994, pp. 127-154; B. DELCOURT and O. CORTEN, Ex-Yougoslavie, Droit
international, politique et iddologie, Brussels, Bruylant, 1998.
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I. - THE Kosovo QUESTION :
BETWEEN SELF-DETERMINATION
AND MINORITY PROTECTION
The first item to be addressed is the categorisation, according to interna-
tional law, of the Kosovo problem. The legal definition of the Kosovo
Albanians was, indeed, a key element in the conflict. This is because, from
the initial description chosen (people/minority), different legal consequences
ensue (self- determination/individual rights). First, the views of both sides
in the conflict, namely the Yugoslav/Serbian authorities and the Kosovo
Albanian leadership, will be considered. The clash of arguments between
the parties reflects the problematic character of the relationship between
the notion of people and that of minority (A). Secondly, the reaction of
foreign states to the competing stances of the parties to the conflict will be
examined. In particular, the grounds invoked to consider the issue as a
matter of international concern, the status allocated to the Kosovo
Albanians at international level, and the solution promoted to settle the
conflict will be discussed (B).
A. - A Question of Minority?
If one tries to define the situation of the Kosovar Albanians according
to international law, the notion of minority seems to be the most
appropriate. There is no accepted definition of the concept of 'minority' in
international law (29). However, the definition proposed by Francesco
Capotorti is usually referred to in the doctrine :
<<a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a
non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the state - pos-
sess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the
rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, direc-
ted towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language)) (30).
These criteria seem to adequately describe the situation of the ethnic
Albanians in the FRY. They represent 15-20 % of the population of the
country (31). They distinguish themselves by their language (Albanian) and
(29) On the problems raised by the definition of minorities, see, inter alia, M. SHAW, <(The
Definition of Minorites in International Law e, I. Y.H.R., 1990, pp. 13-43; F. RIGAUX, ((Mission
impossible la dhfinition de la minorit6 e, Rev. trim. dr. h., 1997, pp. 155-175; P. THORNBERRY,
International Law and the Rights of Minorities, supra note 1, pp. 164-172; J. PACKER, # On the
Definition of Minorities #, in J. PACKER and K. MYNTTI, supra, note 1, pp. 23-65; G. KoUBI,
<Penser les minoriths en droit s, in A. FENET et al., supra note 1, pp. 251-297; N. ROULAND,
S. PIERRt-CAPs and J. POUMARkDE, 8upra note 1, pp. 232-239.
(30) Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979), 96.
(31) Special report on minorities, supra note 4, § 31.
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religion (roughly 95 % are Muslims and 5 % Catholics) (32), from the Ser-
bian-speaking and Orthodox Christian majority. They do, undoubtedly,
wish to preserve their distinct identity.
It has often been noted that the absence of any definition of the term
minority in international law is a major weakness in relation to the ability
to protect them, ( because it allows states to deny certain groups the status
of a minority by denying the qualification as such ) (33). In the context of
Kosovo, however, precisely the contrary phenomenon can be observed :
while the Yugoslav/Serbian authorities regard the Kosovo Albanians as a
minority, the latter reject this qualification because they claim to constitute
a people (1). Considering the views of each side can serve to highlight some
problematic aspects of the concept of minority, in particular its rela-
tionship with the notion of 'people' (2).
1. The Views of the Parties to the Conflict
a) The Position of the Yugoslav and Serbian Authorities
Statements by Yugoslav and Serbian officials persistently referred to the
'Albanian national minority' or 'Albanian national community'. In fact,
the FRY Constitution formally guarantees a high degree of protection for
national minorities (34). In a declaration annexed to its constitution, the
Republics of Serbia and Montenegro even committed themselves to ensur-
ing # the highest standards of the protection of human rights and the rights
of national minorities provided for in international legal instruments and
CSCE documents ) (35). FRY officials argued that the Kosovo issue was an
internal affair of the Serb Republic, and for a long time resisted any inter-
national involvement in the settlement of the crisis (36). They also
(32) N. MALCOLM, supra note 5, p. 14.
(33) R. WOLFRUM, ((The Legal Status of Minorities in South-Eastern Europe s, in
R. LEFEBER, M. FITZMAURICE and E.W. VIERDAG (eds), The Changing Political Structure of
Europe, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991, pp. 131-148, at 131.
(34) See art. 11, 15, 20, and 45 to 50 of the Constitution of Yugoslavia, adopted on the
27 April 1992.
(35) See the 1992 Declaration annexed to the 1992 Constitution. The CSCE (Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe) was renamed OSCE (Organisation on the Security and Co-
operation in Europe) at the Budapest Summit, in 1994 (Declaration of the Budapest Summit,
6 December 1994).
(36) See, for example, the declaration of President Milosevic at his meeting with the Russian
Foreign Minister Mr. Primakov (Belgrade, 18 March 1998, Agence Europe, no 7183, 19 March
1998); declaration of President Milosevic at his meeting with American emissary Richard
Holbrooke in Belgrade (Agence Europe, no 7219, 11 May 1998); statement by Ratko Markovic,
Vice-President of the Government of Serbia, 13 March 1998 (FRY Press Release). See also the
4 European Union report on the situation in Kosovo s, 21 April 1998, Annex I to the Report of
the UN Secretary -General prepared pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998), 30 April
1998, 8/1998/361, § 4. Acting on a suggestion by the FRY President, S. Milosevic, the Serbian
Government held a referendum on 23 April 1998, asking the population of Serbia whether they
agreed with participation of foreign representatives in the solution of the Kosovo crisis (Report
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insistently repeated that there were minorities or communities other than
the Albanians living in Kosovo; not only the Serbian community but also
Goranies, Egyptians, Muslim Slavs, Turks and Romanies. Consequently,
they sustained that the basis for any solution for Kosovo had to be the
((equality of all national communities in Kosovo e (37). It must be noted
that the Albanian community, as admitted by Yugoslav officials them-
selves (38), represents some 90 % of the inhabitants of the province, while
the Serbian community is estimated at around 8 %. As for the five remain-
ing groups, although the statistics mentioned vary (39), they logically can-
not represent, altogether, much more than 2 % of the province's popula-
tion. But Yugoslav officials insisted that < all national communities, regar-
dless of their numbers, are mutually equal and therefore, in relations
among them there can be no discrimination)) (40). Accordingly, the political
settlement they favoured, was to be based on < self-government of national
communities ) as well as << self-government of citizens ) in Kosovo (41).
b) The Position of the Kosovar Albanian Side
As for the Kosovo Albanian leaders, they stridently refused to be
categorised as a 'minority' <<The Albanian experience in Yugoslavia of
being permanently viewed as a minority and having even the autonomy
guaranteed in the 1974 Constitution stripped from them has had profound
of the UN Secretary- General, 4 June 1998, S/1998/470, § 36). However, from September 1998, the
US Ambassador to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Peace Envoy, Christopher
Hill, was able to organise indirect talks between the Belgrade authorities and Kosovo Albanians
(6 Information on the situation in Kosovo and measures taken by the OSCE s, Annex to the
Report of the UN Secretary-General, 3 October 1998, S/1998/912).
(37) See, for example, the FRY statement on the talks of the FRY President, Mr. Slobodan
Milosevic, with Dr Ibrahim Rugova and members of his delegation (15 April 1998); FRY Press
Release on Talks in Pristina (22 May 1998); s Introductory statement by Mr. Milutinovic, Presi-
dent of the Republic of Serbia at the talks with the representatives of national communities in
Kosovo and Metohija # (Pristina, 18 November 1998); Joint Proposal of the Agreement on the
Political Framework of Self-Governance in Kosovo and Metohija (Belgrade, 20 November 1998);
Common statement by the President of the FRY, Slobodan Milosevic and the President of the
Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, 16 June 1998 (D.A.I., 1 August 1998, no 15, p. 561, § 1). Note
that the principle of <, equality of nations and nationalities 4 was regarded as a key principle in
the constitutional system of the former Yugoslavia (B. BAGWELL, ((Yugoslav Constitutional
Questions Self-Determination and Secession ), in Ga. J.Int. & Comp. L., 1991, pp. 489-523,
p. 504).
(38) See the website of the Yugoslav Government <http://www.gov.yu/kosovo> ('Facts
about Kosovo and Metohija').
(39) For details about population statistics demography in Kosovo, see #Qui habite le
Kosovo ? s, extract from Diagonales Est-Ouest, no 52, Lyon, 1999, January-February, reprinted
in B. ADAM (ed.), La Guerre du Kosovo, dclairages et commentaires, GRIP-Complexe, Brussels,
1999, p. 13. See also S.L. WOODWARD, supra note 10, p. 34.
(40) Joint Proposal of the Agreement on the Political Framework of Self-Governance in Kosovo
and Metohija, (Belgrade, 20 November 1998), Preamble.
(41) See the Yugoslav/Serbian counter-proposal to the Rambouillet plan drafted by the Con-
tact Group (infra, section 111). Text available on the website of the Balkan Action Organisation
< http://www.balkanaction.org >.
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effects. The notion of once more being regarded as a minority was and
remains anathema to Kosovo Albanians * (42). In its 'Constitutional Decla-
ration' (July 2, 1990), the 'Assembly of Kosova' proclaimed that :
((Albanians being the overwhelming majority in Kosova and one of the
largest groups of people in Yugoslavia consider themselves to be worthy of a
nation as Serbs and others do - and no longer a national minority # (43).
At the time this declaration was adopted, the former Yugoslavia still
existed and the Albanian leadership was arguing that an Albanian
Republic should be created within it. Their claim to be a 'nation' must be
first understood in the light of the Yugoslav context. The constitutional
law of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) recognised, on
the one hand, six constitutive 'peoples' or 'nations' (narod) corresponding
to the six Republics and, on the other hand, many 'nationalities' (narod-
nost). The distinction rested officially on the fact that only the latter had
a kin-state outside Yugoslavia. However, in reality, according to former
Yugoslavia's constitutional law experts, the term 'nardodnost' did not have
a clear meaning even in Serbo-Croatian and other official Yugoslav
languages. <<It was introduced in the 1974 Constitution and the official
political jargon in the belief that it was less offensive to the minorities,
because it did not indicate that they were any way inferior, but only ethni-
cally different from the Yugoslav 'nations' s (44). In spite of these ter-
minological subtleties, since only those groups designated as a 'people' had
their own Republic, consideration as a 'nationality' (narodnost) was resen-
ted by the Albanian community as being an inferior status.
However, on October 19, 1991, the Albanian leaders proclaimed the inde-
pendence of 'the Republic of Kosova' and have since asserted the Kosovar
Albanian position as a 'people' in the sense of international law. They have
argued consequently that Kosovar Albanians were entitled to self-deter-
mination which implied, in their view, a right to independence. After the
Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, created by the European Com-
munities (EC), rendered its opinions on the break-up of the former
Yugoslavia (45), they also affirmed that the reasoning of the Commission,
justifying the independence of the Republics, could be applied to Kosovo.
Lastly, they advocated that, given the systematic discrimination and
repression suffered by their population under Yugoslav and Serb rule, they
(42) H. POULTON, Minorities in Southeast Europe : Inclusion and Exclusion, London, MRG
Publication, 1998, pp. 25-26.
(43) 'Constitutional Declaration', Assembly of Kosova, 2 July 1990, §3.
(44) Milan PAUNOVIC, # Nationalities and Minorities in the Yugoslav Federation and in Ser-
bias, in J. PACKER and K. MYNTTI (eds), supra note 1, pp. 145-165, at 149, 150. See also Vojin
DIMITRIJEVIC, supra note 2, p. 15.
(45) I.L.M. 31, 1992, pp. 1494 and s.
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should be allowed to secede (46). It will be seen below how foreign states
reacted to each of these arguments (47).
2. Minority/People : Two Sides of the Same Coin?
The discrepancy between the language of the FRY/Serbian authorities
and that of the Kosovar Albanian leaders, reflects some of the difficulties
posed by the relation between the notions of 'minority' and 'people'.
Whilst, in theory, international law attributes different meanings and
implications to each of these notions (a), they remain closely linked in prac-
tice. This could be explained by the fact that they are inspired by a com-
mon root; the political ideal of 'national emancipation' (b).
a) The Notions of 'People' and 'Minority' in International Law
All attempts at definition of minorities in international law rest upon a
combination of objective and subjective elements. In order to be regarded
as a minority, a group must first distinguish itself from the rest of the pop-
ulation on the basis of 'objective criteria', namely specific national, ethnic,
religious or linguistic characteristics. In addition, the members of the group
must fulfil a subjective condition, namely sharing a sense of solidarity
directed towards preserving the distinctive character of that com-
munity (48). It can be observed that this definition of the minority does
not seem to depend on any self-perception of having this status by the
group concerned. There is no provision, in the case of minorities, similar to
that existing with respect to indigenous peoples, which makes a self-iden-
tification as indigenous or tribal [...] the fundamental criterion for deter-
mining the groups to which the provisions of [the 1989 International
Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention no 169] apply # (49).
Indeed, the existence of a minority is usually considered to be a matter
of fact, which is understood as meaning that it does not depend upon a
decision by the state (50). On the other hand, it is accepted that belonging
(46) On the Kosovo Albanian positions, see, inter alia, H. POULTON, Minorities in Southeast
Europe, supra note 42, p. 26 and Veton SURROI, s Kosova and the Constitutional Solutions ), in
T. VERENIs and E. Koros (eds), Kosovo Avoiding another Balkan War, Eliamep University of
Athens, 1998, pp. 145-173.
(47) For the arguments based on the Arbitration Commission Opinions, see Part I, Section B,
I of this article. For that based on . right to secede, see Part III, Section B, 2.
(48) Definitions of the term 'minority' usually add two other conditions : minority members
must be nationals of the state and in a non-dominant position. However, these conditions raise
controversies. See M. SHAW, supra note 29. See also the General Comment of the Human Rights
Committee n' 23(50) on article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) (UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.5, 1994), §5.
(49) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO Con-
vention n' 169, 27 June 1989, art. 1, § 2.
(50) P.C.1 J., Greco-Bulgarian Communities case, Ser. B., 1930, n' 17. See also the General
Comment of the Human Rights Committee on article 27 (supra note 48), § 5.2, last sentence.
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to a national minority is a matter of individual choice (51). This contention,
however, pre-supposes that the minority exists, even whilst leaving its
members free to consider themselves part of the group or not. Yet, if all
the members of a community do not want to be treated as belonging to a
minority, the aggregate sum of these individuals as a group can hardly be
deemed as such. However, it does not follow from this that such a group
could then qualify as a 'people , in the legal sense of the term, only by vir-
tue of its own choice. As Fran9ois Rigaux puts it :
< dans un texte juridique, le mot 'peuple' n'est pas purement descriptif, il
ne se refere pas A des attributs que l'entit6 ainsi qualifi6e aurait par elle-mime,
il s'agit d'une d6nomination constitutive : n'est un peuple que la collectivit6
que l'ordre juridique reconnait comme telle# (52).
Now, unlike the term minority, in the international legal order, the con-
cept of 'people' entitled to self-determination is not defined on the basis of
'cultural' criteria, but rather by reference to a certain territory; the right
to self-determination is vested in the whole population of a colony or an
independent state (53). Therefore, with international law as it stands, in
order to determine which rights the Kosovar Albanians as members of a
group are entitled to claim, they must be regarded as a minority.
Nonetheless, the notion of minority, as understood in international law,
appears very similar to the notion of people as it is used in political dis-
course or in everyday language (54). Certainly, the same group can be
deemed a minority in the ambit of international law, while considering
itself a people in the political sphere (55). The problem is that legal and
political discourses interact with each other, and the legal consequences
attached to the terms can influence the preference for one or the other con-
cept. The reluctance of Kosovar Albanians to be categorised as a minority
can be best understood as the consequence of the different treatment inter-
national law (and initially Yugoslav law) accords to each category of group.
While the notion of people is associated with the right to self-determina-
(51) Document of Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE (1990) (hereinafter OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document), § 32; Council of Europe
Framework -Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, § 3.
(52) F. RICAUX, supra note 29, p. 166.
(53) As it will be seen below, this point raises controversies. See the following sub-section b)
and Part II, Section A, 1.
(54) The complication is compounded by the fact that certain states recognise the existence
of different 'peoples' identified by ethnic criteria in their domestic legal order. This was the case
of the former Yugoslavia's political system, as seen above. It is also the case of the present con-
stitution of the Russian Federation, which uses a wide range of different terms to designate the
various groups living in the country. See N. VITRUK, ( The Russian Federation and autonomy :
A Preliminary Perspective ), in Local Self-Government, Territorial Integrity and Protection of
Minorities, European Commission for Democracy through Law, Council of Europe Publishing,
1996, pp. 114-150. However, in both cases, constitutional law does not contain any general
definition of the 'people', as an abstract category. Rather, the law expressly designates the
specific groups that are to be regarded as peoples.
(55) F. RIGAUx, supra note 29, p. 166.
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tion, which is recognised as a collective right and is directly linked to the
exercise of political power, the international protection granted to
minorities only deals with individual rights and is concerned, generally
speaking, with the cultural sphere (56).
b) The Origin and Development of Minority Rights and Self-Determination
of Peoples
The difficulty encountered by those who attempt to draw a neat distinc-
tion between the concepts of 'people' and 'minority' in the ambit of inter-
national law probably results from the fact that they have a common
origin; they both stem from the nineteenth century theories of national
emancipation and the Nation-State political model (57).
Broadly speaking, the Nation-State model postulates that political boun-
daries must coincide with the sharing of a common culture (58). The success
of this political ideal was such that, by the end of the nineteenth century,
the equation 'one Nation-one State' had become self-evident. It was com-
(56) It may also be observed that the term 'minority' has an inherent derogatory connota-
tion. A minority is basically defined as 'something less' Usually, this means a numerical
inferiority, but it is often associated with a disadvantaged position in the economic, social or
political field. See F. RIGAUX, supra note 29, p. 155. In the view of J. Packer the minority posi-
tion should even be considered as the main element of the definition, rather than the 'ethnic',
'religious', 'linguistic' or 'cultural' criteria (((On the Definition of Minorities ), in J. PACKER and
K. MINTTY (eds), supra note 1, p. 57). Moreover, the notion of minority is relative; minorities are
always defined by contrast with a certain majority. See A. EIDE, ((Minority Protection and
World Order *, in Universal Minority Rights, supra, note 1, p. 89. The categorisation of a group
as a minority thus depends on the arena that one views. Albanians are a minority at the national
level vis-a-vi8 the Serb population but, at the regional level, they become a majority, while the
Serbs feel marginalised. This situation raises the well-worn problem of 'sub -minorities', since the
minority which finds itself in majority at the regional level, may reproduce dominant attitudes
towards smaller groups living in this region.
(57) On the history of minority protection in international law, see, inter alia,
P. THORNBERRY, supra note 1, pp. 25-54; H. HANNUM, supra note 1, pp. 50-73; P. THORNBERRY,
a Is there a Phoenix in the Ashes? ), Texas Int. L. J., 1980, pp. 421-458; J. VERHOEVEN, ( Les
principales 6tapes de la protection internationale des minorit6s s, Rev. trim. dr. h., 1997, pp. 177-
203; J.J. PREECE, a Minority Rights in Europe : from Westphalia to Helsinki ), Rev. of Int.
Studies, 1997, pp. 75-92.
(58) The notion of 'nation' or 'people' emerged in the context of the American and French
Revolutions. This first conception of the people was a territorial one; the people was then
described as the collectivity of citizens living in the same State. See E.J. HOBSBAWM, Nations
and Nationalism since 1780, Programme Myth and Reality, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1990. This territorial conception of the nation could easily fit Western European countries,
where the rise of national theories had been preceded by centuries of centralisation of political
power in a defined territory. However, once created, the notion could be transposed and adapted
to other contexts. See B. ANDERSON, Imagined Communities. Reflection on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism, London/New York, Verso, 1996, p. 4. In regions where pre-existing state-centred
political organisation was lacking, the linguistic or ethnic criteria became central to the definition
of the nation, thus justifying secession by 'national communities' to form their own state. This
second tradition is associated with the ideology of nationalism, described by Ernest Gellner as
<<a political principle which maintains that [.. . whatever principles of authority may exist
between people depend for their legitimacy on the fact that the members of the group concerned
are of the same culture * (E. GELLNER, Nationalism, Phoenix, 1997, p. 3).
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monly accepted that human groups identified as a 'nation' or a 'people',
namely united by a common language, history or descent, should be
entitled to form their own state (59). However, the implementation of the
model outside its area of emergence, in particular in Central and Eastern
Europe, where relations between local communities and central authorities
had hitherto been structured on different bases, had profound effects on
these societies (60). It necessitated first, the determination, if not the crea-
tion, of 'national groups', united by a common language, a shared history
and traditions (61), and secondly, the <territorialisation des identits # (62),
namely the linking of each group to a specific territory. Nevertheless, the
principle according to which each 'nation' or 'people' is entitled to form
its own state was never accepted as a legal basis for the organisation of
international society (63). It is well-known that frontiers were not drawn
exclusively according to the location of 'national' groups (which would
have been impossible in practice anyway). Many communities were spread
across different states, in particular after the boundary changes effected at
the end of the First World War.
Yet, already in the nineteenth century, the Great Powers attempted to
counter-balance the contradiction between the dominant political ideal and
the reality on the ground. They did this by introducing forms of interna-
tional protection of minorities in newly created or enlarged states, which
culminated in the League of Nations system (64). This is how the notion of
'minority' appeared in international law. Therefore, minorities were con-
ceived as portions of a 'nation' or a 'people', living in the 'wrong' state.
In other words, the legal notion of minority derives from an ethnically-
based conception of the 'people' (65). This link is reflected by the adjec-
tives commonly associated with the term minority in international
documents, namely 'ethnic', 'linguistic', 'religious', and, above all,
'national' On the other hand, as underlined by Serge Pierr6-Caps, the
(59) According to E.J. Hobsbawm, the words 'people' and 'nation' were generally used
indiscriminately by nineteenth century theorists (see supra note 58, pp. 18-19).
(60) B. BADIE, La fin des territoires. Essai sur le desordre international et sur l'utiliti sociale
du respect, Paris, Fayard, 1995.
(61) According to E.J. Hobsbawm (supra note 58), the emergence of 'national identities' in
the nineteenth century were, to a large extent, the product of concerted policies developed by
states or intellectual elites, in order to enlist popular support for a certain political project. See
also E. GELLNER (supra, note 58) and A-M. THIESSE, ( La lente invention des identit6s
nationales s, in Le Monde Diplomatique, June 1999.
(62) B. BADIE, supra note 60, p. 120.
(63) M. KOSKENNIEMI, a National Self-Determination Today : Problems of Legal Theory and
Practice ,, I.C.L.Q., 1993, pp. 241-269, at 253.
(64) On the interaction between international law and the political ideology of nationalism
in the inter-war period, see N. BERMAN, i A Perilous Ambivalence Nationalist Desire, Legal
Autonomy, and the Limits of the Interwar Framework s, Harvard Int. L. Journ., vol. 33, 1992,
pp. 353-379 and ('But the alternative is despair' European Nationalism and the Modernist
Renewal of International Law s, in Harvard L. Rev., 1993, pp. 1793-1903.
(65) On this point, see the observations of Gerard NOIRIEL, IN La tyrannie du national. Le
droit d'asile en Europe (1793-1993), Paris, Calmann-L6vy, 1991, pp. 95-100.
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inter-war system of minority protection also introduced an important
corrective to the Nation-State model, by insinuating a certain dissociation
between cultural membership and citizenship. For national groups, it
entailed that statehood was not a necessary condition for the enjoyment of
their collective identity, while for states, it implied that diverse national
communities could coexist within the same frontiers (66).
As for the concept of 'people', in the sense of the beneficiary of the right
to self-determination, this entered international law after the Second World
War in the context of de-colonisation. The right to self-determination was
first recognised as the right to become free from colonial ruling. By virtue
of the principle of uti possidetis, which postulates the preservation of
colonial boundaries at the moment of independence, such right was to be
exercised within the framework of the colonial territory. Hence, the people
entitled to self determination included all the population of the colony. To
be sure, the right of self-determination has been recognised as the right of
all people and has been embedded in documents of universal scope, first and
foremost the common article 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants.
However, this does not imply an endorsement of a conception of the
'people' based on ethnicity. In effect, outside the colonial context, and
situations that have been assimilated to this (namely foreign occupation or
racist regime), the relevant 'people' is understood as encompassing the
whole population of the state (67). Therefore, in all cases, the people is
territorially - as opposed to ethnically - defined; it encompasses the
entire population of a colony or a state (68).
The significance of the distinction between 'minority' and 'people' in
international law, lies in the different legal consequences attached to each
(66) La Multination, I'avenir des minoritis en Europe centrale et orientale, Paris, 0. Jacob,
1995. This is in line with the view expressed by the P.C.I.J. in 1935 : a the idea underlying the
treaties for the protection of minorities is to secure for certain elements incorporated in a State,
the population of which differ from them in race, language or religion, the possibility of living
peaceably alongside that population and co-operating amicably with it, while at the same time
preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the majority* (Albanian Minority
Schools, Advisory Opinion, P.C.I.J., 1935, Series A/B, no 64).
(67) For an account of the interpretation of article 1 of the International Covenants by state
parties as it emerges from the reports submitted to the Human Rights Committee, see
T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 158-162.
(68) M. SHAW, International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 4th ed., 1997,
pp. 177-182; R. HIGGINs, Problems & Process. International Law and How we use it, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 111-128; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Territories and Peoples, G.A. Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960; G.A. Resolution 1541
(XV) (1960); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution 2625
(XXV), 1970; common article 1 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For a general analysis of the
UN documents and state practice on this issue, see, inter alia, T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, esp.
p. 615; H. HANNUM, s Rethinking Self-Determination , V.J.I.L., vol. 34, no 1, 1993, pp. 1-69;
H. QUANE, ( The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination s, I.C.L.Q., 1998,
vol. 47, pp. 537-572; 0. CORTEN , Droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-mmes et sti possidetis
deux faces d'une mhme m6daille? s, R.B.D.I., 1998/1, pp. 161-189.
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concept. Indeed, despite renewed interest in minority protection since the
end of the Cold War, the status of minorities in international law remains
limited. Firstly, minorities do not have any legal personality. Rights are
conferred upon 'persons belonging to minorities', not upon minorities as
such. In other words, the existence of a minority is only a factual pre-con-
dition for the recognition of the individual rights of its members. Secondly,
the rights spelled out in relevant international instruments are, broadly
speaking, limited to cultural activities (69), with the exception of the right
to participate in public affairs (70). By contrast, 'peoples' are entitled to
self-determination, defined as the right << to freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment # (71). As stressed by Patrick Thornberry :
< there is a qualitative difference between the two categories : the right of
self-determination means full rights in the cultural, economic and political
spheres. The essence is political control. [...] The rights of minorities are
enumerated and finite, and do not include political control ) (72).
(69) Article 27 of ICCPR reads : o In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their
religion, or to use their own language *. The Human Rights Committee, however, has developed
a dynamic interpretation of the provision (see Human Rights Committee, General Comment,
art. 27, supra note 48, § 6). Note that the legal value of most international instruments concern-
ing minorities is weak. Article 27 of ICCPR remains the only universally binding provision.
Neither the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities of the UN General Assembly (Resolution 47/135, adopted without a
vote, 18 December 1992), nor the OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document, which both contain
detailed lists of rights recognised to minority members, are legally binding. The only interna-
tional treaties dedicated entirely to minority issues are the Framework-Convention for the Protec-
tion of National Minorities, adopted by the Council of Europe on the 10 November 1994 and
entered into force in February 1998, and the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages, adopted by the Council of Europe on the 5 November 1992 and entered into force
in March 1998. See, inter alia, N. LEVRAT, # Solutions institutionnelles pour soci6t6s plurielles s,
in MinoriOe et organisation de l'Eta, supra note 1, pp. 3-90; G. ALFREDSSON and D. TURK,
o International Mechanisms for the Monitoring and Protection of Minority Rights : their Advan-
tages, Disadvantages and Interrelationships #, in A. BLOED, L. LEICHT, M. NoWAK and A. ROSAS
(ed.), Monitoring Human Rights in Europe, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp. 169-186;
P. THORNBERRY, # The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities s, Universal Minority Rights, supra note 1;
F. BENOiT-ROHMER, o La Convention-cadre du Conseil de l'Europe pour Ia protection des
minorit6s nationales s, E.J.I.L., 1995, pp. 573-597; G. GILBERT, o The Council of Europe and
Minority Rights o, H.R. Q., 1996, pp. 160-189; J. WRIGHT, o The OSCE and the Protection of
Minority Rights *, H.R.Q., 1996, pp. 190-205; J. WRIGHT, # The Protection of Minority Rights in
Europe : From Conference to Implementation *, I.J.H.R., 1998, pp. 1-31).
(70) The right to participation in public affairs is discussed below, in Part II, section B, 2.
(71) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514 (XV), 14 December 1960; common article 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants.
(72) P. THORNBERRY, s Is there a Phoenix in the Ashes? s, supra note 57, p. 454. This does
not mean that the presently recognised rights of minority members are meaningless. In a great
number of cases, these rights can satisfy the needs and demands of those communities. The
activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, created by the OSCE in 1992 as an
instrument of prevention of conflicts involving minorities, demonstrate in particular the impor-
tance of provisions concerning education and political participation. See V. RAMELOT and
E. REMACLE, L'OSCE et les conflits en Europe, Dossiers du GRIP, 1995, Brussels, pp. 39-69.
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Hence, the right to self-determination has furnished the legal justification
for the accession to independence of former colonies. This is usually referred
to as the external aspect of self-determination; namely, the right to choose
one's own status without external interference. However, this does not mean
that now that the de-colonisation process is almost complete, the right to self-
determination has lost all true meaning. As Rosalyn Higgins writes :
<(it is not only at the moment of independence from colonial rule that
peoples are entitled freely to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development. It is a constant entitlement. And that in turn means that they
are entitled to choose their government)> (73).
Indeed, as highlighted by Theodore Christakis in a thorough study of the
right to self-determination outside the colonial context, states increasingly
admit that such a right also has an internal aspect. In this respect, it
entitles the population to have a government reflecting its wishes. In other
words, it implies a right to democracy, vested in the entire population of
any country (74). On the other hand, states remain reluctant to grant
rights to specific internal groups, in the fear of encouraging separatist
drives. All international instruments on minorities cautiously restate the
principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers. In this
respect, all states have a common interest in limiting the status of
minorities in order to protect their territorial integrity. To a certain extent,
the FRY could thus feel comfortable in categorising the Albanians as a
minority and committing itself to observing the highest standards of
protection provided for minorities in international instruments (see the con-
stitutional declaration quoted above). To be sure, many of the recognised
rights of members of minorities were violated in the case of Kosovo
Albanians (75). However, even if they had been respected, it is far from
clear that this would have satisfied their demands for greater political con-
trol over the territory of Kosovo.
B. - International Reactions : Neither Self-Determination,
Nor Minority Protection
As a rule, a dispute between a sub-state group and its government con-
stitutes an internal matter of the state concerned. From an international
(73) See supra note 68, p. 120.
(74) T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 332-425. The author arrives at this conclusion on the
basis of the analysis of various international conventions, in particular the two 1966 Interna-
tional Covenants. He points out that since the end of the 1980s, a growing majority of states,
as it emerges from the reports submitted to the Human Rights Committee, interprets article 1
as laying down an obligation to have a political system allowing the expression of the will of the
people. The position of the Human Rights Committee, when examining the reports, has also
evolved in this sense. This point has also been stressed by Rosalyn Higgins (supra note 68,
p. 120).
(75) Special report on minoritie8, supra note 4, § 31.
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law standpoint, therefore, the first issue of interest in the international
reaction to the Kosovo issue, is that of the legal ground on the basis of
which third-party states justified their involvement in the crisis (1).
Moreover, this legal basis had important implications as regards the legal
definition of the issue by international actors and, consequently, the solu-
tions to the conflict which they promoted (2).
1. International Involvement in the Crisis
In order to understand the international position on Kosovo, it is
necessary to return to the period of the disintegration of the former
Yugoslavia. Although Kosovo was a secondary issue on the international
agenda, it was at this point that foreign states formulated the basic tenets
that would govern their approach (a). Indeed when, given the emergence
of the KLA and the escalation of violence, Western states committed them-
selves actively to the resolution of the conflict in late 1997, their position
remained consistent with their initial stance (b).
a) The Break-up of Yugoslavia - Non Recognition of Kosovo as a State
The claim for self-determination and independence expressed by the
Albanian leadership, did not find much support internationally. While
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were recognised
relatively quickly as independent states and admitted to the UN, no state
(except for Albania) (76) recognised the self-proclaimed 'State of Kosovo'
In particular, the European Communities (EC) countries ignored the
request for recognition as an independent state which Kosovo repre-
sentatives submitted in December 1991, along with the republics, after
holding a referendum (77).
However, as seen above, Kosovo could not claim to have a legal right to
independence, either on territorial grounds (as a federal unit), or on ethnic
grounds (by virtue of the will of the Albanian ethnic group). Despite the
rise of nationalist claims since the end of the Cold War (78) and the conse-
quent revival of the 'secessionist' interpretation of the right to self-deter-
mination (79), until the Yugoslav war, the actual practice of states did not
(76) Subsequently, under pressure from Western governments, the Albanian President Sali
Berisha abandoned calls for the independence of Kosovo and aligned himself with the demand
for autonomy within Yugoslavia. See M. VICKERS, a Tirana's Uneasy Role in the Kosovo Crisis
(March 1998 - March 1999) *, in Kosovo, Myths, Conflicts and War, supra note 6, pp. 31-37, at
31.
(77) Keesing's, December 1991, p. 38685. See also R. CAPLAN, # International diplomacy and
the crisis in Kosovo ,, International Affairs, 1998, no 74, pp. 745-761, p. 748.
(78) T. FRANCK, # Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession s, in Peoples and
Minorities in International Law, supra note 1, pp. 3-27.
(79) M. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 63, pp. 257-260.
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appear to support any change in the traditional legal conception of self-
determination. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the separation of
Cechoslovakia, or the reunification of Germany, all occurred with the con-
sent of the central authorities, which implies that the right to self-deter-
mination was exercised by the whole population of the state (80). By con-
trast, the former Yugoslav Republics' declarations of independence were
opposed by the central authorities of the former Yugoslavia and had there-
fore to be deemed as acts of secession. Nonetheless, this episode does not
seem to imply any admission of a right for ethnic groups to secede (81).
Indeed, within the framework of the UN, the republics were recognised as
states without any reference to the principle of self-determination but,
rather, on the basis of the new factual situation (82). Yet, the position of
the European Union (EU) countries in this context was more equivocal.
Their statements frequently referred to the right of peoples to self-deter-
mination, even before they recognised the independence of the former
Yugoslav Republics. This could suggest that they had admitted that sub-
state entities were entitled to self-determination (83). However, such con-
clusion would be in contradiction with the reaction of the EU countries to
other recent secessionist conflicts, where they contented themselves with
reaffirming the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state (84).
In addition, the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, established
within the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, which provided the European
policy of recognition with a legal justification (85), did not explain the inde-
pendence of the republics on the basis of the right to self-determination.
(80) These events are perfectly consistent with the traditional conception of self-determina-
tion; the right of peoples organised in a state to opt for voluntary separation, dissolution or
integration with another state falls within the scope of their right to choose their international
status. On this point, see H. HANNUM, o Rethinking Self-Determination)s, supra note 68, p. 51
and H. QUANE, supra note 68, p. 566.
(81) H. HANNUM, supra note 68, p. 53 and H. QUANE, supra note 68, p. 570.
(82) A. PELLET, a Quel avenir pour le droit des peuples i. disposer d'eux-mgmes ? #, in
Milanges Jiminez de Arichaga, Montevideo, Fondacion de cultura universitaria, 1994, p. 263;
0. CORTEN, supra note 68, pp. 179-180.
(83) For an analysis of the evolution of the EC/EU statements throughout the Yugoslav con-
flict, see B. DELcOURT and 0. CORTEN, Ex-Yougoslavie : Droit international, politique et iddologie8,
Bruylant, Brussels, 1998, esp. pp. 89 and s. See also M. WELLER, o The International Response
to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia o, A.J.I.L., 1992, pp. 569-607.
For a political analysis, see S.L. WOODWARD, 8supra note 10, chap. 7, pp. 199-222.
(84) B. DELCOURT and 0. CORTEN, 8upra note 83, pp. 35-36. Note that the new states emerg-
ing from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia were not 'ethnically homogenous' either.
Also, the claims for independence expressed by ethnic groups within the former Republics
(namely Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia - were rejected -
(85) B. DELCOURT and 0. CORTEN, supra note 83, pp. 135-137; H. QUANE, 8upra note 68,
p. 570. For a general analysis of the Arbitration Commission advisory opinions, see
M.C.R. CRAVEN, a The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia ), B. Y.I.L.,
1995, pp. 333-413; A. PELLET, o Note sur Ia Commission d'arbitrage de la conf6rence europ6enne
pour la paix en Yougoslavie #, A.F.D.I., 1991, pp. 329-348 and A. PELLET, # The Opinions of the
Badinter Arbitration Committee. A Second Breath for the Self Determination of Peoples'),
E.J.I.L., 1992, vol. 3 no 1, pp. 178-181.
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Rather, it first stated that the federal organs had lost all effective
authority in most republics (86) and, secondly, asserted that the principle
of uti possidetis applied to the internal boundaries of a dissolving state (87).
This reasoning enabled the Commission to regard the disintegration of
Yugoslavia as an instance of dissolution rather than secession, and to con-
clude that the republics would be the successor entities within the former
internal boundaries of the SFRY. However, the Kosovar Albanian leaders
argued that the reasoning of the Arbitration Commission could similarly
justify the independence of Kosovo. It was, indeed, commonly admitted
that, in the 1974 Constitution, << the autonomous provinces were for all
practical purposes promoted to the status of fully fledged federal
units # (88). Kosovo had (<its own Constitution, its own Presidency which
represented it in Yugoslavia and abroad, its own Parliament, Government,
Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, administrative organs, national bank
and other governmental institutions ) (89). It was represented in all Federal
bodies and had its own delimited borders. Therefore, Kosovo Albanians
claimed that the principle of Uti possidetis should be applied to its borders
as well (90). The line drawn between the case of the republics and that of
(86) Advisory Opinions no 1 and no 8 (I.L.M., 1992, no 31, pp. 1494 and s.).
(87) Advisory Opinion no 2.
(88) V. DIMITRIJEVIC, sspra note 2, p. 17.
(89) V. SURRol, supra note 46, pp. 145-146 and 167.
(90) H. POULTON, Minorities in Southeast Europe, supra note 42, p. 26; M. WELLER, ( The
Rambouillet conference on Kosovo ,, International Affairs, 1999, pp. 163-203, p. 215. This
illustrates some of the practical difficulties that can arise from the application of the principle
of uti possidetis to former administrative boundaries. First of all, when different degrees of decen-
tralisation exist in the dissolving state, like the republics and autonomous provinces in the
SFRY, debates may arise as to which internal borders must be taken into account. Similarly,
in the context of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, << a major question was the future status
of the entities within some of the Union Republics which under the Soviet constitution were
defined as 'autonomies' but on a lower level in the hierarchy than the Union Republics them-
selves s, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan or
Crimea in Ukraine (A. EIDE, < Territorial Integrity of States, Minority Protection, and Guaran-
tees for Autonomy Arrangements . Approaches and Roles of the United Nations s, in Local Self-
Government, Territorial Integrity and Protection of Minorities, European Commission for
Democracy through Law, Council of Europe Publishing, 1996, p. 289). Moreover, the autonomy
of Kosovo was forcibly suppressed shortly before the general break-up of Yugoslavia. This under-
lines another problem of application of the uti possidetis principle; the internal structure of the
state can be subject to last minute changes by the central government. Marcelo Kohen holds that
( [l]orsque des modifications sont effectubes, que ce soit par les autoriths centrales ou locales, par
des moyens non pr6vus par l'ordre juridique interne, celles-ci sont inopposables #. But he adds
that ( une modification effectu6e par l'autorith centrale qui est contesthe par l'entit6 concernbe
qui devient plus tard ind6pendante, pourrait laisser la question ouverte. La pratique interna-
tionale ne fournit pas d'6liments suffisants pour trancher la question #. (( Le probl6me des fron-
tihres en cas de dissolution et de s6paration d'Etats : quelles alternatives? s, in R.B.D.I., 1998/1,
vol. 31, pp. 129-160, pp. 154-156). For a general discussion of the scope and legal value of the
uti possidetis principle, see R.B.D.I., issue 1998/1, esp. B. DELCOURT, ((L'application de l'uti
possidetis au d6membrement de la Yougoslavie r~gle coutumihre ou imphratif politique? ',
pp. 70-106; P. KLEIN, ( Les glissements s6mantiques et fonctionnels de l'sti possidetis s, pp. 106-
128; M. G. KOHEN, op. cit., pp. 129-160 and 0. CORTEN # Le droit des peuples h disposer d'eux-
m6mes et uti possidetis : deux faces d'une m8me m6daille? s, pp. 161-189.
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the autonomous provinces may, indeed, appear somewhat artificial, since in
the Yugoslav situation the differences were almost all merely formal (91).
A further argument invoked by the Kosovar Albanian leadership was
based on the theory of a right to secession as a 'remedy of last resort'.
According to a large number of international law scholars, an ethnic group
which is totally excluded from the political system and is the victim of
systematic egregious violation by state authorities of fundamental human
rights, is entitled to secede (92). Nonetheless, assuming that the case of
Kosovo Albanians would have fulfilled the criteria, this view was not
endorsed by the states, since they refused to recognise the independence of
Kosovo (93).
On the other hand, in their efforts to settle the Yugoslav wars, Western
states included, from early on, the requirement that Kosovo's autonomy be
restored (94). However, in order to obtain the co-operation of the Serbian
authorities in the resolution of the Bosnian conflict, they resigned them-
selves to not insisting on the issue (95). This question was thus left out of
the Dayton Agreement (96) and, after the end of the war, the fate of the
province seemed to slip from the international agenda (97).
(91) H. HANNUM, ((Rethinking Self-Determination)), supra note 68, p. 38.
(92) For a discussion of this view, see T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 295-315. The author
concludes that a right to secession in favor of an ethnic group does indeed exist, but only in
extreme cases of massive breaches of basic human rights, when there is no other possible means
to remedy to such a situation (idem, p. 314). See also infra, Part III, Section 3, 2.
(93) C. HILLGRUBER, ( The Admission of New States to the International Community,
E.J.I.L., pp. 491-509, at 509.
(94) At the beginning of the workings of the Conference on Yugoslavia, the issue of Kosovo
was subsumed in the search for a general solution for all significant minorities in Yugoslavia,
first and foremost, the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia. The first draft plan presented, in
October 1991, by Lord Carrington at the Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague, provided for
(special status s in ((areas in which persons belonging to a national or ethnic group form a
majority #. As expressly mentioned in the draft, this status was designed to apply in particular
to the Serb minority in Croatia (Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to § 3 of Security Council
Resolution 713 (1991), Annex VI, § 2.5). The second draft contained a provision which concerned
Kosovo more directly : e [t]he Republics shall apply fully and in good faith the provisions exist-
ing prior to 1990 for autonomous provinces s (idem, Annex VII, C, § 6).
(95) R. CAPLAN, supra note 77, p. 750.
(96) The issue is mentioned only in relation to pre-conditions for the lifting of remaining sanc-
tions against the FRY (idem).
(97) Certainly, the EU member states and the US continued to assert that the normalisation
of their relations with the FRY would depend, inter alia, on the progress made with respect to
Kosovo. See the Presidency's Declaration on the recognition of the FRY by the EU member
states, 9 April 1996 (Agence Europe, no 6705, 11 April 1996); Presidency Conclusions of the
Florence Summit, 23 June 1996 (Agence Europe, no 6755, 23 June 1996); Dublin European Coun-
cil (13-14 December 1996), Declaration on Former Yugoslavia (Agence Europe, no 6875,
15 December 1996). For the US position, see the statement made by the American Secretary of
State Warrent Christopher, in visit in Belgrade, 5 February 1996 (Agence Europe, n' 6660,
5 February 1996). However, despite the absence of any progress, in April 1997, the EC decided
to extend the autonomous trade measures system to the FRY (Decision of the General Affairs
Council, Luxembourg, 29 April 1997, Agence Europe, no 6965, 30 April 1997). In February 1998,
during a visit in Yugoslavia, R. Gelbard, the US envoy to the Balkans, announced the easing
of the sanctions against Serbia and denounced the KLA as a ( terrorist organisation s. Albanian
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b) The Escalation of Violence - International Involvement in the Kosovo
Question
At the end of 1997, in response to the emergence of Albanian armed
groups in Kosovo, the FRY launched a vast crackdown operation, provok-
ing a flood of refugees into neighbouring countries (98). The escalating
violence led to an increasing international reaction from early 1998 (99).
Western countries belonging to the Contact Group approved sanctions
against Yugoslavia, with Russia dissenting (100). Europe and the US exer-
cised growing pressure on the Belgrade authorities for international par-
ticipation in the resolution of the conflict (101). In March 1998, the UN
Security Council called upon the parties <urgently to enter without pre-
conditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues # (102) add-
ing in its next resolution, in September, the requirement of ((international
involvement ) in these negotiations (103).
Yugoslav officials, however, continued to claim that the Kosovo issue
was a Serbian affair, to be dealt with internally (104). How then did states
and international organisations justify their involvement in the resolution
of the crisis? As seen above, they did not endorse Kosovar Albanian claims
for self-determination. Nor did they refer to minority protection, despite
the frequent assertions in recent years that minority issues should
nowadays be considered as ((matters of legitimate international con-
cern ) (105). Rather, it emerges from official international statements that
their commitment to the resolution of the crisis was based on two con-
siderations; the danger it posed to regional stability and, to a lesser extent,
leaders claim that this denunciation prompted in part the Serbian authorities' crackdown in
Kosovo (Keesing's, February 1998, p. 42085 and March 1998, pp. 42156-157).
(98) See the reports of the UN Secretary-General, in particular, 4 June 1998, S/1998/470;
2 July, S/1998/608; 5 August, 8/1998/712; 4 September, 8/1998, 834.
(99) In March, the US State Department announced that it was withdrawing the concessions
which it had granted to Yugoslavia in February (Keesing's, March 1998, p. 39240). R. Gelbard
also reiterated a warning issued by the then US President, George Bush, in December 1992 of
possible US intervention in Serbia if violence in Kosovo risked igniting a wider regional conflict
(ibidem).
(100) Contact Group Meeting, statements on Kosovo, London, 9 March 1998, § 7 and § 6;
Bonn, 25 March 1998, § 6; Rome, 29 April 1998, § 9. Statements of the Contact Group can be
found on the website of the High Representative Office : < http://www.ohr.int/contacthtm >. In
June, the EU Council adopted a Common Position for a ban on new investments in Serbia
(Agence Europe, no 7237, 8 June 1998).
(101) See for instance, the European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Cardiff Summit,
16 June 1998, Annex II, Declaration on Kosovo (Agence Europe, no 2094/95, 18 June 1998), § 5.
Diplomatic observers from several countries began patrolling in Kosovo in an attempt to
promote negotiations between the parties (Keesing's, July 1998, p. 42413), while the Contact
Group started to draft a peace plan for Kosovo (Keesing's, August 1998, pp. 42458-59).
(102) Resolution 1160 (1998), 31 March 1998, § 4.
(103) Resolution 1199 (1998), 23 September 1998, § 3. See also Resolution 1203 (1998),
24 October 1998, § 5. Resolution 1160 (1998) only ( notes the readiness of the Contact Group to
facilitate such . dialogue ) (§ 4).
(104) See supra note 23 and 36.
(105) Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, Geneva, 1991, II, § 3.
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the flagrant violations of basic human rights. <<The crisis constitutes a
serious threat to regional stability and requires a strong and united interna-
tional response ,, stated the EU Member States in June 1998 (106).
Similarly, the French President J. Chirac affirmed, in March 1998, 4 nous
ne pouvons accepter I'engrenage d'une guerre civile qui menacerait, de
proche en proche, la stabilit6 de l'ensemble du Sud-Est de l'Europe s (107).
In October 1998, the United States' President Bill Clinton declared that
<as a result of the unconscionable actions of President Milosevic, we face
the danger of violence spreading to neighbouring countries, threatening a
wider war in Europe. We face a humanitarian crisis [...] (108). Also, the
Security Council, in Resolution 1199 (1998) (109), expressed its deep con-
cern about << the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation
throughout Kosovo ) and considered that ((the deterioration of the situa-
tion constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region ).
However, even though third-party states justified their involvement in
the conflict on the basis of regional security and violations of individual
human rights, their demands went beyond the cessation of violence and
included the requirement of a certain political solution.
2. The International Response to the Crisis
This section considers more closely the requirements addressed to the
FRY by the other states. It examines, firstly, the status conferred upon the
(106) European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Cardiff Summit, 16 June 1998,
Annex II, declaration on Kosovo (Agence Europe, n" 2094/95, 18 June 1998), §2. See also the
EU's common position on restrictive measures, adopted by the European Union Council
(Brussels, 20 March 1998, Agence Europe, no 7185, 21 March 1998); Conclusions of the General
Affairs Council on the situation in the Balkans, 26 May 1998 (Agence Europe, no 7229, 27 May
1998); EU's common position on the ban on new investments in Serbia, 8 June 1998 (Agence
Europe, no 7237, 8 June 1998).
(107) Statement of the French Republic Presidency, Paris, 8 March 1998 (D.A.I., no 9, 1 May
1998, p. 314). Decision no 218 of the OSCE Permanent Council (§ 5) states that the Kosovo crisis
exceeds the ambit of FRY's internal affairs because of the violations of human rights norms and
because of its regional impact (Vienna, 11 March 1998, D.A.I., no 9, 1 May 1998, p. 316).
(108) 4 Remarks by the US President on Kosovo *, The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, October 8, 1998. American officials' statements on Kosovo are released on the US
State Department website : < http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/Kosovo >. The reasons for
US concern in Kosovo were detailed by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, as follows
# America has a fundamental interest in peace and stability in southern Europe. [...] America has
a fundamental interest in preserving Bosnia's progress toward peace [.. .] which would be
seriously jeopardized by renewed violence in nearby Kosovo. [...] Spreading conflict could
reignite fighting in neighboring Albania and destabilize fragile Macedonia, [...] affect our NATO
allies, Greece and Turkey, [...] flood the region with refugees and create a haven for international
terrorists, drug traffickers and criminals. Regional conflict would undermine NATO's credibility
as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. This would pose a threat that America could
not ignore* (Remarks and Q & A Session at the US Institute of Peace, Washington D.C.,
4 February 1999, as released by the Office of the Spokesman US Department of State).
M.K. Albright's statements can be found on the website of the secretary of state : < http://
secretary.state.gov/www/statements >.
(109) 23 September 1998.
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Albanian community at international level (a), and secondly, the content
and legal justification of international demands (b).
a) The Yugoslav Ethnic Albanians on the International Scene
Faced with the competing categorisations used by Yugoslav officials and
ethnic Albanian leaders, foreign states and international organisations
similarly bypassed the terms 'Albanian minority' and 'Albanian people'
This attitude can be illustrated through the expressions used in UN
Security Council resolutions and in Contact Group statements. They
addressed the 'Kosovar Albanian community' or the 'Kosovar Albanian
leadership', when calling for a dialogue or demanding the end of terrorist
acts. However, the solution put forward was described as 'an enhanced
status for Kosovo within FRY' It referred then to the whole territory of
Kosovo and not to one particular community (110). In addition, they
cautiously underlined that the solution had to take into account < the rights
of Kosovo Albanians and all those who live in Kosovo > (111). It was clear
then that although the 'Albanian community' was regarded as a party to
the conflict, the settlement proposed was purported to concern the entire
population of the province, regardless of ethnic differences. A similar ter-
minology appeared in statements issued by other international actors tak-
ing a stance on the conflict, such as the EU (112), the OSCE (113),
NATO (114) and the G8 countries (115).
(110) Contact Group statements, New York, 24 September 1997; London, 9 March 1998,
Security Council Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998). Source : see supra note 100.
(111) Office of the High Representative, Contact Group statement, Moscow, 25 February
1998; London, 9 March 1998; Bonn, 25 March 1998. Source see supra note 100.
(112) See, for instance, Common position on Kosovo, Brussels, 19 March 1998 (D.A.I., no 9,
1 May 1998, p. 317); Statement of the British Presidency, acting on behalf of the European
Union, on the adoption of a common position on Kosovo, Brussels, 23 March 1998 (Agence
Europe, no 7186, 23 March 1998); Cardiff Summit Declaration, Annex II, Declaration on Kosovo,
18 June 1998 (Agence Europe, no 2094/95, 18 June 1998); << European Council Statement on the
reasons and aims of European participation in action against the FRY s, Berlin, 25 March 1999
(Agence Europe, no 7433, 26 March 1999). See also the conclusions of E.C. General Affairs Council
meetings Brussels, 24 February 1998 (Agence Europe, no 7167, 25 February 1998); Brussels,
30 March 1998 (D.A.I., no 10, 15 May 1998, p. 358); Brussels, 25 May 1998 (Agence Europe,
no 7229, 27 May 1998); Luxembourg, 29 June 1998 (Agence Europe, no 7253, 1 July 1998);
Brussels, 14 July 1998 (Agence Europe, no 7263, 15 July 1998).
(113) Decision n' 218 of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 11 March 1998 (D.A.I., no 9,
1 May 1998, p. 316); 7th Ministery Council of the OSCE, Oslo, 2-3 December 1998, declaration
on Kosovo (D.A.I., no 3, 1 February 1999, p. 144).
(114) North Atlantic Council Meeting, declaration on the situation in Kosovo, 30 April 1998
(D.A.I., no 12, 15 June 1998, p. 445); North Atlantic Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 28 May
1998, (D.A.I., no 14, 15 July 1998, p. 503); North Atlantic Council Meeting, declaration on
Kosovo, Brussels, 11 June 1998 (D.A.I., no 14, 1998, p. 511); North Atlantic Council Meeting,
declaration on Kosovo, Brussels, 8 December 1998 (D.A.I., no 2, 15 January 1999, p. 64).
(115) Conclusions of the Meeting of G8 Foreign Affairs Ministers, London, 9 May 1998
(D.A.I., no 13, 1 July 1998, p. 471).
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In its declaration following the end of the Rambouillet Conference, the
Contact Group undertook to work towards achieving < a settlement meeting
the legitimate aspirations of all the people of Kosovo # (116). However, the
French translation, which talks about # l'ensemble des habitants du
Kosovo * (117), makes it clear that the term 'people' was used without any
legal connotation, as a synonym for 'population'. Similarly, the Security
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) called for < an interim administration for
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the FRY ). Again, the French version - ( la population du
Kosovo # - confirms that the use of the word 'people' was not supposed to
have a legal significance.
b) The International Demands
There was a striking consensus among states with regard to the settle-
ment that should be promoted for Kosovo. In line with their initial stance,
they continued to reject Kosovar Albanians' claims to statehood.
Statements or resolutions issued by the UN (118), the EU (119), the
OSCE (120), NATO (121) or the Contact Group, constantly re-affirmed
respect for the territorial integrity of the FRY and opposition to the inde-
pendence of Kosovo. However, they also maintained the demand for the
restoration of Kosovo's autonomy. Certain variations in the formulations
of this requirement can be observed, progressing through the crisis from a
mere 'special status' to *self- administration' or 'self-government'.
In fact, in its first statement on Kosovo, dated 24 September 1997, the
Contact Group did not mention 'autonomy' It called the parties ( to join
in a peaceful dialogue # and specified that it did not support either inde-
pendence or the status quo but instead < an enhanced status for Kosovo
within the FRY)) that < should fully protect the rights of the Albanian pop-
(116) Rambouillet, 23 February 1999, emphasis added. The word 'people' also appeared in
a an earlier statement of the Contact Group, dated 8 January 1998, when it called upon ((the
authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community [...] to promote
[...] a solution [ ...] in order to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future their people') (Washington
D. C., 8 January 1998. Source : see supra note 100). Since the term 'people' is used in the
singular form, it must be understood as referring to the whole population of the FRY.
(117) Statement reprinted in Le Monde, 25 February 1999.
(118) Security Council Resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 Septem-
ber 1998 and 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998.
(119) ((The European Union remains firmly opposed to independence> (European Council,
Conclusions of the Presidency, Cardiff Summit, 16 June 1998, Annex II, declaration on Kosovo,
§ 6, supra note 106). See also the Conclusions of the General Affairs Council on the situation in
Kosovo, Brussels, 30 March 1998, (D.A.I., n' 10, 15 May 1998, p. 358); Luxembourg, 27 April
1998 (D.A.I., no 12, 15 June 1998, p. 442); Brussels, 25 May 1998 (D.A.I., no 14, 15 July 1998)
(120) Ministry Council, Oslo, 2-3 December 1998, Declaration on Kosovo (D.A.I., no 3,
1 February 1999, pp. 144-145).
(121) North Atlantic Council Meeting, Declaration on Kosovo, Luxemburg, 28 May 1998
(D.A.I., no 14, 15 July 1998, p. 503), Brussels, 8 December 1998 (D.A.I., no 2, 15 January 1999).
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ulation in accordance with OSCE standards and the UN Charter ) (122).
Similarly, in November, the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany,
Hubert V6drine and Klaus Kinkel, in their joint letter to Milosevic, affir-
med that a lasting solution had to provide for a <<special status # for
Kosovo (123). In their statements dated 9 and 25 March 1998, the Contact
Group members took a stronger position :
e we support an enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRY which a sub-
stantially greater degree of autonomy would bring and recognise that this must
include meaningful self-administration)) (124).
This declaration received strong international support; it was backed by
the EU (125), but also by the European Conference (126) as well as a group
of countries from Southeast Europe (127), and was endorsed by the
Security Council in Resolution 1160 (1998) (128). In the following months,
the support for Kosovo's autonomy was reiterated many times by the
Council of the EU (129), but also by the G8 Foreign Affairs Ministers (130)
and, finally, was endorsed by the OSCE (131) and NATO (132). The peace
plan proposed at Rambouillet marked a further evolution, for it was aimed
at providing 'self-government' for Kosovo (133).
It is important to note that all these statements continued to emphasise
the primary necessity of a dialogue between the FRY authorities and the
Albanian community. The Security Council, in Resolution 1160 (1998), call-
ing upon the FRY to offer the Kosovar Albanian community < a genuine
(122) New York, 24 September 1997. See also the next Contact Group Statement,
Washington D.C., 8 January 1998. (Source see supra note 100).
(123) 19 November 1997 (D.A. I., no 1, 1 January 1998, p. 36). See also the Ministry Council
of the OSCE, Copenhagen, 19 December 1997 (D.A.I., 15 February 1998, no 4, 133) and the
North Atlantic Council declaration on the situation in Kosovo, 30 April 1998, (D.A.I. no 12,
15 June 1998, p. 445) and 28 May 1998 (DAI, no 14, 15 July 1998, p. 503)
(124) London 9 March 1998, § 9 and Bonn. 25 March 1998, § 13 (emphasis added). Source : see
supra note 100.
(125) Common position on Kosovo, 19 March 1998 (D.AI., no 9, 1 May 1998, p. 316).
(126) Statement of the 26 Heads of States and Governments of the European Conference,
London, 12 March 1998 (D.A.I., no 9, 1 May 1998, p. 316).
(127) Joint statement of Foreign Affairs ministers of Bulgaria, Greece, FYROM, Romania
and Turkey, Sofia, 10 March 1998 (D.A.I., no 9, 1 May 1998, p. 316).
(128) 31 March 1998, § 5.
(129) See, for instance, the Conclusions of the General Affairs Council, Brussels, 26 May 1998
(Agence Europe, no 7229, 27 May 1998), Luxembourg, 8 June 1998 (Agence Europe, no 7237,
8 June 1998), 29 June, (Agence Europe, no 7253, 1 July 1998), Brussels, 14 July 1998 (Agence
Europe, no 7263, 15 July 1998). See also European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Cardiff
Summit, 16 June 1998, Annex II, declaration on Kosovo (supra note 106).
(130) Conclusions of the Meeting of G8 Foreign Affairs Ministers, London, 9 May 1998
(D.A.I., no 13, 1 July 1998, p. 471).
(131) 7th Ministry Council of the OSCE, Oslo, 2-3 December 1998, Declaration on Kosovo
(D.A.I., no 3, 1 February 1999, pp. 144-145).
(132) North Atlantic Council, Ministry session, Declaration on Kosovo, Brussels, 8 December
1998 (D.A.I., no 2, 15 January 1999, pp. 65-66).
(133) The draft plan is entitled Interim Agreement on Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo.
See infra, Part III, Section A.
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political process)) (§ 3), specified that, t without prejudging the outcome of
that dialogue ), it < expresses its support for an enhanced status for Kosovo
which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and
meaningful self-administration s (§ 4). By the same token, the Council of
the EU, while reaffirming its support for an enhanced status for Kosovo,
stated that ( there had to be a valid political process in which the parties
themselves could determine a solution without delay to the political status
of Kosovo through negotiations s (134). Yet, given the positions of the par-
ties, calling on the authorities to negotiate a political status for Kosovo
with the Albanian leadership, was equivalent to requiring them to grant a
large degree of autonomy. The FRY was thus required to make certain
changes to its internal structure, although it was given the possibility to
negotiate these changes with representatives of the population of the
region (135). In any case, from January 1999, the parties were expressly
required to negotiate on the basis of the peace plan drafted by the Contact
Group (136). In effect, when giving the reasons for the air operations in the
FRY, the NATO Secretary-General stated, inter alia :
((We are taking action following Yugoslavia's refusal of the international
community's demands : acceptance of the interim political settlement which
has been negotiated at Rambouillet [...] (137).
However, the legal grounds on the basis of which the FRY was sum-
moned to grant autonomy to Kosovo were somewhat hazy. Third-party
states and international organisations constantly insisted on the fact that
their primary concern was to end the violence, to prevent a humanitarian
catastrophe and to ensure a lasting peace in the region (138). On the other
hand, certain statements from American officials acknowledged the
legitimacy of the aspirations of Kosovo's inhabitants (139). However, the
same statements also clearly underlined that the granting of autonomy was
(134) Conclusions of the General Affairs Council on the situation in the Balkans, Brussels,
26 May 1998 (Agence Europe, no 7229, 27 May 1998). See also European Council, Conclusions of
the Presidency, Cardiff Summit, 16 June 1998, Annex II, declaration on Kosovo (supra
note 106).
(135) The French Foreign Affairs Minister, Hubert V6drine, described the objective of the
Contact Group as follows : #il s'agit de r~unir les conditions permettant une n~gociation, de part
et d'autre, pour aboutir a, une solution politique autour d'un statut d'autonomie substantielle
(Contact Group Meeting, Statement of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Hubert
Vedrine, Paris, 15 October 1998, in D.A.I., no 23, 1 December 1998, p. 890).
(136) Contact Group Statement, London, 29 January 1999. Source : see supra note 100.
(137) Statement by NATO Secretary General, 23 March 1999 (Keesing's, March 1999,
p. 42847). The other demands were # full observance of limits on the Serb army and special
police forces agreed on October 25 and ending of excessive and disproportionate use of force in
Kosovo#.
(138) See the declarations quoted above, notes 106 and 108.
(139) See, for instance, Remarks and Q&A Session, M.K. Albright, U.S. Institute of Peace,
Washington DC, 4 February 1999 (source : see supra note 108). See also the last sentence of the
'Statement by the President on the Massacre of Civilians in Racak' (Washington DC, 16 January
1999, White House, Press Secretary). It is important to stress that these statements always refer
to the whole population of the region of Kosovo and not solely to the ethnic Albanians.
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necessary for security or humanitarian reasons. On one occasion, the US
Secretary of State, M. K. Albright, went so far as to expressly use the word
.right', stating that : ((The crisis will not end until Belgrade accepts
Kosovo's need for, and right to, substantial autonomy * (140). This was,
however, an isolated declaration, and even in this sentence, the prior aim
seems to be the putting an end to the crisis. Moreover, in another state-
ment made by Mrs Albright on the same day, the reference to a 'right' no
longer appeared (141). In conclusion, autonomy for Kosovo was required
by third-party states first and foremost as a necessary means to restore peace
and security in the region, rather than as a recognised right of the Kosovar
Albanians (142).
The group of states that took an active role in the Kosovo crisis thus
remained true to their initial stance; as they involved themselves in the
crisis for security and humanitarian reasons, they justified their demands
on the grounds that they were necessary in order to obtain a cessation of
violence. The Yugoslav authorities were thus required to allow Kosovo
autonomy, not as a right, but rather in order to put an end to the turmoil
created in the region and, in consequence, the violations of basic human
rights. However, territorial autonomy does not constitute, in abstracto, a
means to protect human rights. Such a regime could be promoted as a solu-
tion to the conflict only because the Kosovar Albanians themselves were
claiming a particular political status. Therefore, even though their claim for
independence was rejected, the political aspirations of the Kosovar
Albanians were partially endorsed by foreign states.
The question remains whether this apparently ad hoc solution could find
any basis in international law. Indeed, normally, international law is
neutral with respect to internal conflicts. For sure, as emphasised by
Olivier Corten, #la neutralit6 ne signifie pas le vide juridique # (143). Even
in the case of civil wars, international law prescribes respect for fundamen-
tal human rights and regulates the means to be used by the belligerents.
However, << la neutralit6 implique de s'abstenir de prendre parti sur le fond
des revendications ' (144). It is true that the UN Security Council had
determined that the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and
security in the region (145). Since, once it has made such a determination,
the Security Council has a large discretion in the suggestion or imposition
(140) Secretary of State, M.K. Albright, Statement to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels,
Belgium, 8 December 1998, as released by the Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State
(emphasis added). Source : see supra note 108.
(141) Press Conference at NATO Headquarter, Brussels, Belgium, 8 December 1998, as
released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. Source : see supra note 108.
(142) On this point, see T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, p. 572.
(143) 0. CORTEN, supra note 68, p. 182.
(144) Ibidem.
(145) Resolution 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998).
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of measures aimed at restoring peace and security (146), requiring a coun-
try to grant autonomy to end an internal conflict may well appear to be
within the framework of its powers (147). Indeed, it has considerably
extended the range of its interventions in internal conflicts in recent
years (148). However, the demands for autonomy were already formulated
by states before the Security Council had made such a determination. Addi-
tionally, the latter, generally speaking, played a secondary role in the issue,
contenting itself with endorsing the positions of the Contact Group. Yet,
autonomy is not an episodic measure, it implies a profound and lasting
change in the internal structure of a country. Moreover, if it could be
rooted in international law, the solution promoted for Kosovo might
become applicable to other comparable conflicts. For all these reasons, it
is worth exploring further whether the requirement of autonomy for certain
sub-state groups can find a basis in international law.
II. - AUTONOMY, MINORITIES AND SECESSIONIST
CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Introduction : the Significance
of Autonomous Regimes for Minorities
The notion of 'autonomy' is < not a term of art or a concept that has a
generally accepted definition in international law # (149), but is generally
( understood to refer to independence of action on the internal or domestic
level # (150). It differs from independence in that it always implies a limited
list of powers, whereas independence implies < the totality of powers
without any need for enumeration)) (151). Since the words 'territorial
autonomy' and 'self-government' are often used indiscriminately, the 1985
European Charter of local self-government can provide a useful indication of
the legal sense attributed to the latter notion :
(146) M. SHAW, International Law, supra note 68, pp. 877-879.
(147) T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, p. 572.
(148) In particular, the Security Council has considered in certain cases that (free and
genuine elections and/or constitution of 'widely representative governments' were a significant
measure to solve regional or local conflicts* (J. SALMON, , Internal Aspects of the Right to Self-
Determination Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle? s, in Modern Law of Self-Deter-
mination, supra note 1, pp. 253-282, p. 273 and references cited). See also T. CHRISTAKIS, supra
note 1, pp. 481-502.
(149) H. HANNUM and R.B. LILLICH, ((The Concept of Autonomy in International Laws,
A.J.I.L., 1980, pp. 858-889, p. 858.
(150) Ibidem, p. 860.
(151) R. LAPIDOTH, ((Some Reflections on Autonomy ), in Milanges offerts a Paul Reuter,
Paris, Pedone, 1981, pp. 379-389, p. 381. See also the views of Yoram DINSTEIN, 5 The Degree
of Self-Rule of Minorities s, in Peoples and Minorities in International Law, supra note 1, pp. 221-
235. On the relation between minority protection and federalism, see N. LEVRAT, #La protection
des minorit6s dans les syst6mes fed6raux *, Rev. trim. dr. h., no 30, 1997, pp. 229-271.
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1. Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local
authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial
share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of
the local population. 2. This right shall be exercised by councils or assemblies
composed of members freely elected by secret ballot on the basis of direct,
equal, universal suffrage, and which may possess executive organs responsible
to them. [...]) c(152).
On the basis of a survey of a large number of autonomy arrangements
in the world, Hurst Hannum and Richard Lillich have suggested that a
((fully autonomous # territory should include :
1) <<a locally elected body with some independent legislative power [...] c;
2) ((a locally chosen chief executive, possibly subject to approval or confir-
mation by the principal government, which has general responsibility for the
administration and execution of local laws or decrees [...] s;
3) ((an independent local judiciary, some members of which may also be
subject to approval or confirmation by the central/principal government, with
jurisdiction over purely local matters [...]# (153).
Autonomous systems can also be organised on a personal basis. Regimes
of 'personal autonomy' have been recently introduced or reintroduced in
favour of minorities, in several Central or Eastern European states, in par-
ticular in Hungary (154). However, within the framework of this paper, the
focus will be on territorial autonomy, since this was the solution proposed
for Kosovo.
When a minority is concentrated in one region of the state, the claim for
the right to enjoy its specific cultural identity frequently merges with a
demand for more control over general affairs of the region. In such cases,
the establishment of decentralised institutions clearly permits the minority
group to protect its own language or culture from the risk of state policies
of assimilation. Beyond that, it enables the minority to have a greater
(152) European Charter of Local Self-Government, 15 October 1985, Council of Europe,
European Treaties, ETS no 122, art. 3.
(153) H. HANNUM and R.B. LILLICH, supra note 149, pp. 886-887. See also H. HANNUM,
Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, supra note 1, p. 467.
(154) Broadly speaking, these systems consist of the delegation of certain powers, usually in
cultural and educational matters, to institutions managed by representatives of the minority
group, with jurisdiction extending to all individuals registered as belonging to the minority. On
theories about personal autonomy, see S. PIERRt-CAPS, supra note 1, Chapter 8, pp. 255-282 and
for a more critical viewpoint, T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 535-538. On recent laws on per-
sonal or cultural autonomy, see inter alia, P. KoVAcs, ( L'6mergence des diff6rentes formes
d'autonomie dans la protection des minoriths dans certains pays de l'Europe centrale et orien-
tale ,, in E. DECAUx and A. PELLET (eds.), Nationalitis, Minorits et Successions d'Etats en
Europe de lEst, CEDIN-Paris X, Cahiers internationaux, Paris, Montchrestien, 1996, pp. 163-
187; B. TsILEVICH, <(The situation of ethnic minorities in Latvia s, in M. OPALSKI and
P. DUTKIEWICs (eds), Ethnic Minority Rights in Central Eastern Europe, Canadian Human Rights
Foundation, Forum Eastern Europe, Ottawa, 1996, pp. 51-60, at 54; V. PETTAI, (a The situation
of ethnic minorities in Estonia ), in idem, pp. 41-50, at 46; S. VAITIEKUS, s The Rights of
National Minorities and their Implementation in Lithuania s, in idem, pp. 61-71, at 68.
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influence over political and economic decisions affecting its members (155).
Evidently, an autonomous regime entails a loss of power for the central
government and may lead to a spiral of demands from local authorities for
increasing devolution of powers. As a solution, therefore, the graunting of
territorial autonomy depends on compromise (156). It has the advantage of
being flexible and adaptable in various circumstances. Above all, it makes
it possible to (( reconcile the right to territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence of the state with the aspirations of minorities and local popula-
tions to determine their own way of life)) (157). It has, indeed, been used
by many states to respond to the demands of territorially concentrated
minorities (158). However, this practice does not, by itself, entail that those
states had any opinio juris that they were under an international obligation
to do so. It is commonly accepted that :
(las international law now stands, states are under no obligation whatsoever
to establish any form of political or administrative decentralisation in favour
of minorities. International law cannot force states to adopt a particular state
structure. It is of no avail to seek evidence of a practice common to states in
regard to territorial autonomy which might form the outline of a customary
rule s(159).
On the other hand, there is a growing acknowledgement internationally
that autonomy can often be an adequate response to the phenomenon of
territorial minorities. Elaborating on the Kosovo episode, one could ask
whether, in certain circumstances, a government can be required to grant
a status of autonomy to a culturally distinct group. This section first
examines the existing body of rules to see if any norm of international law
supports the hypothesis of the existence or the emergence of a right to
autonomy for certain sub-state groups (A). In the Kosovo context, the
requirement of autonomy was nonetheless primarily justified on the basis
of security considerations. In order to determine whether this attitude
could reflect a wider acceptance by states of the idea that, in the case of
internal conflict, a government can be required to allow a status of
autonomy to a rebellious region, as a means to restore peace and security, the
(155) A. EIDE, ((Territorial Integrity of States, Minority Protection, and Guarantees for
Autonomy Arrangements Approaches and Roles of the United Nations s, in Local Self-Govern-
ment, Territorial Integrity and Protection of Minorities, Seminar organised in Lausanne, 25-
27 April 1996, European Commission for Democracy through Law, Council of Europe Publishing,
1996 (hereinafter Local Self-Government...), p. 301.
(156) T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 538-544.
(157) R. LAPIDOTH, supra note 151, p. 379.
(158) See, in particular, Local self-Government..., supra, note 155. In the framework of a study
on conflicts involving minorities around the world, Ted Gurr underlines that the allocation of
autonomy regimes has permitted the settlement of a significant number of those conflicts.
(T.R. GURR, Minorities at Risk : a Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, Washington D.C.,
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, pp. 300-305).
(159) G. MALINVERNI, ((Local Self-Government, Territorial Integrity and Protection of
Minorities - Final Report ), in Local Self-Government..., supra note 155., pp. 313-329, at 316.
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reactions of the OSCE Member States towards other internal conflicts com-
parable to the one in Kosovo will be discussed (B).
A. - Is there a Right to Autonomy in International Law?
It emerges from the international law literature dedicated to the issue of
autonomy (160), that two grounds could, theoretically, furnish a legal basis
for a right to autonomy for certain sub-state groups : the right to self-
determination on the one hand (1), minority protection on the other
(2) (161).
1. Autonomy as a Form of Self-Determination?
According to a particular interpretation of the right to self-determina-
tion, sub-state groups could be, in certain circumstances, entitled to
autonomy (a). However, state practice does not support the view that this
interpretation has, indeed, become positive law (b).
a) Theories
The right to self-determination is often understood to be synonymous
with independence. However, it has always been clear that this is not the
case. General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) lays down that this right
is susceptible to implementation through :
<< the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free associa-
tion or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other
political status freely determined by a people # (162).
Hence, Rosalyn Higgins has stressed that the core meaning of 'self-deter-
mination' is not independence but the < free choice of peoples # (163). Also,
as explained above, outside the colonial context, the people entitled to self-
determination normally encompasses the whole population of an existing
state. Particular groups within the state are not entitled to unilaterally
decide their political status by virtue of a right to self-determination.
(160) See, inter alia, H. HANNUM, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self Determination, supra
note 1; Local Self-Government..., supra note 155; H. HANNUM and R.B. LILLICH, supra note 149;
R. LAPIDOTH, supra note 151; D. SANDERS, ((Is Autonomy a Principle of International Law? *,
in N.J.I.L., 1986, pp. 17-21; H.J. STEINER, < Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over
Autonomy Regimes for Minorities ), in Notre-Dame L.R., 1991, pp. 1539-1560.
(161) There are also instances of regional autonomies guaranteed by an international treaty.
Among the most famous cases lies the status of Trentino-Alto-Adigio established by the De Gas-
peri-Gruber Agreement, in 1945 (S. BARTOLE, ( The situation in Italy s, in Local self-government...,
supra note 155, pp. 51-60). See, more generally, T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 577-584.
(162) Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1970 (emphasis
added).
(163) R. HIGGINS, supra note 68, p. 119.
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Such territorial notion of the concept of 'people' has been subjected to
criticism. Eminent scholars have called for a more 'sociological' definition
which would give more weight to self-identification by the group itself.
Consequently, they contest the dichotomy between the concepts of
'minorities' and 'peoples', the latter being the exclusive beneficiary of the
right to self-determination (164). In the opinion of Ian Brownlie,
((the issue of self-determination, the treatment of minorities, and the status
of indigenous populations, are the same, and the segregation of topics is an
impediment to fruitful work. The rights and claims of groups with their own
cultural histories and identities are in principle the same - they must be. It
is the problems of implementation of principles and standards which vary,
simply because the facts will vary#> (165).
If self-determination means the free choice of peoples, this choice, in the
view of these authors, can be limited by other principles (166); foremost the
territorial integrity of states, which is an essential condition for interna-
tional stability (167). Sub-state ethnic groups could qualify as 'peoples'
entitled to self-determination, but they should exercise this right within the
boundaries of the state. Depending on the circumstances, the right to self-
determination could take various forms - personal or territorial
autonomy, a federal constitution, or any alternative constitutional
framework - depending on the historical, economic or political context of
each case (168). In the same line of argument, Martti Koskenniemi holds
that :
(164) See, inter alia, A. CASSESE, 8upra, note 1; H. HANNUM, (Rethinking Self-Determina-
tion ,, supra note 68; C. TOMUSCHAT, a Self-Determination in a post-modern world , in Modern
Law of Self-Determination, supra note 1, pp. 1-20, at 15; I. BROWNLIE, ((The Rights of Peoples
in Modern International Law #, in The Rights of Peoples, supra, note 1; J. CRAWFORD, ((The
Rights of Peoples *, idem, p. 172; A. PELLET, ((Quel avenir pour le droit des peuples h disposer
d'eux-m6mes? , in Le droit international dans un monde en mutation, Montevideo, 1994, pp. 255-
276. Contra . R. HIGGINS, supra note 68, pp. 119-127 and ((Postmodern Tribalism and the Right
to Secession ), in Peoples and Minorities in International Law, supra, note 1, pp. 29-30; M. SHAW,
((The Definition of Minorities *, supra note 29, p. 20; P. THORNBERRY, ( The Democratic or Inter-
nal Aspect of Self-Determination ), in Modern Law of Self-Determination, supra note 1, pp. 101-
138, at 126, 127.
(165) 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 164, p. 5.
(166) Mc CORQUODALE, e Self-Determination a Human Rights Approach >, I.C.L.Q., 1994,
pp. 857-885.
(167) A. PELLET, ( Quel avenir pour le droit des peuples A disposer d'eux-mimes? n, supra
note 164, pp. 259-260. Contra Olivier Corten holds that the right to self-determination and the
principle of territorial integrity, as defined in relevant international instruments, such as Resolu-
tion 2625 (XV), are corollaries and therefore, one cannot be said to prevail on the other : <(l]e
droit & l'autodetermination, supposant une assise mat6rielle delimitee, entraine l'obligation de
respecter l'int6grit6 de ce territoire. Il s'agit de corollaires, ce qui exclut toute possibilite de con-
tradictions. C'est en ce sens que Ion peut lire plusieurs instruments, comme la r6solution 2625
sur les relations amicales, qui pr6cisent qu'aucun des deux principes ne peut porter atteinte a -
et done pr6valoir sur lautre * (< Droit des peuples i dispoer d'eux-m~mes et uti possidetis #, supra
note 68, p. 174).
(168) A. CASSESE, supra note 1, pp. 351-359. See also F. KIRGIs, ((The Degrees of Self-Deter-
mination in the United Nations era s, A.J.I.L., 1994, p. 306. This view might have been endorsed
by the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia. Asked about the existence of a right to self-deter-
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((to say that self-determination 'applies' is to seek to regulate conflicts by
reference to rules and principles that have no intrinsic connection with the law
of sovereign equality, with its strong presumption on non-interference and
territorial integrity. Self-determination law [...] allows procedural and material
guidelines to be devised that seek to regulate conflict in a pragmatic, ad hoc
fashion [...]) e(169).
b) Practice
Although a thorough assessment of this contention would be beyond the
scope of this article, the view that self-determination could entail a right
to autonomy for internal ethnic groups does not seem to find much support
among states.
In 1993, the government of Liechtenstein forwarded a proposal to the
General Assembly to discuss precisely the ('effective realisation of the right
of self-determination through autonomy # (170). Liechtenstein's proposal
was aimed at developing a < post-colonial > conception of self-determination
focused on autonomy for certain communities within the State, rather than
on independence (171). It suggested that the General Assembly discuss the
different forms, degrees and modalities of implementation of autonomous
regimes. Such a discussion, as Liechtenstein saw it, would have led to an
international treaty guaranteeing different degrees of autonomy for sub-
mination for the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Commission, in its
opinion no 2, first observes that ( in its present state of development, international law does not
make clear all the consequences which flow from this principle ,. Yet, it adds that by virtue of
this right, as enshrined in article 1 of the two 1966 Covenants, every individual is entitled to
choose to belong to whatever community he or she wishes. It concludes that the Serb population
must be afforded every right accorded to minorities under international law. Although its reason-
ing is not clear, the Commission seems to consider that self-determination constitutes the founda-
tion of minority rights. See A. PELLET, << The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee.
A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples ), supra note 85, p. 179; M. WELLER,
((The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)),
supra note 83, p. 592; A. FENET, o L'Europe et les minorit6s s, in A. FENET et al., supra note 1,
pp. 126-129. It must be noted that the conclusions of the Commission amount to a reversal of
the generally accepted conception of minority rights as individual rights and self-determination
as a collective right. Indeed, the Commission designates the < Serbian population # as the collec-
tive holder of # minority rights #, while it regards self-determination as the right of every << mem-
ber of the Serbian population ,. Compare with the General Comment of the Human Rights Com-
mittee on article 27, ICCPR, supra note 48.
(169) M. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 63, p. 266. For an analysis of the conceptual paradoxes
which form the background of contemporary discussions of the issue of self-determination, see
N. BERMAN, a Sovereignty in Abeyance : Self-Determination and International Law s, Wisconsin
I.L.J., 1988, pp 51-105.
(170) H. HANNUM, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, supra note 1, p. 503,
note 1323.
(171) Interestingly, Liechtenstein proposed the use of the term 'community' instead of
people' or 'minority', in order to avoid the problems raised by the two latter notions. The term
'community' was to be understood in this context as referring to a group distinct from the rest
of the population and concentrated in a certain region of the state (T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1,
pp. 546-547).
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state communities (172). The vast majority of states represented in the
Third Committee of the General Assembly, where this proposal was
debated, reacted very negatively to it. In particular, a number of states
declared that the granting of autonomy to a sub-state group had to remain
part of the reserved domain (173). It was finally decided to postpone con-
sideration of the question by the Assembly, to an undetermined future ses-
sion (174). In other words, the majority of states refused even to discuss the
proposal any further.
The right to autonomy based on self-determination, has been most fre-
quently discussed in relation to indigenous groups (175). While acceding to
the demands of those groups to use the term 'indigenous peoples' rather
than 'indigenous populations', in the 1989 ILO Convention, states have at
the same time excluded recognition of a right to self-determination for such
groups. The 1989 ILO Convention n' 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries specifies, indeed, in article 1, § 4 that :
< the use of the term 'people' shall not be construed as having any implica-
tions as regards the rights which may attach to the term under interna-
tional law #. The draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
People (176) attempts to reverse this situation. It states that < indigenous
peoples have the right to self-determination [...] (art. 3) and specifies that
4 as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination, [they]
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their
internal and local affairs [...] (art. 31). Theodore Christakis has stressed
that, in recent years, a growing number of states have declared themselves
in favour of the mentioning of a right for indigenous peoples to self-deter-
mination and to autonomy in this declaration, provided that it is for-
mulated more restrictively (177). This might announce an evolution of
international law in this respect, but limited to the specific case of
indigenous peoples. Such a possibility is facilitated by the fact that the
issue of indigenous peoples does not usually raise the fear of secession. In
(172) For more details about this proposal, see T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 545-553.
Liechtenstein even presented an informal idraft convention on self-determination through self-
administration n (idem, p. 548).
(173) Idem, pp. 550-552.
(174) Idem, pp. 552-553.
(175) On self-determination and autonomy for indigenous peoples, see, inter alia,
L.A. REHOF, ((Human Rights and Self-government for Indigenous Peoples ), Nordic Jour. of
Intern. L., vol. 61 (1), 1992; M.E. TURPEL, <<Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Political Participation
and Self-Determination : Recent International Legal Developments and the Continuing Struggle
for Recognition *, Cornell Int. L. J., 25, 1992, pp. 579-622; E. SPIRY, ((From 'Self-Determina-
tion' to a Right to 'Self-Development' for Indigenous Groups r, German Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law, vol. 38, 1995, pp. 129-152; J.J. CORNTASSEL and T.H. PRIMEAU, ((Indigenous
'Sovereignty' and International Law Revised Strategies for Pursuing 'Self-Determination'
Human Rights Quaterly, vol. 17, 1995, pp. 343-365.
(176) UN doc.E/CN.4/sub.2/1993,19, annex I.
(177) T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 599-601, and more generally on the issue of autonomy
for indigenous peoples, pp. 587-613.
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any case, as of February 2000, the aforementioned declaration, which is not
designed to be legally binding anyway, has not been adopted by the
General Assembly.
The reaction to self-determination claims by Kosovar Albanians reinforce
the impression that the vast majority of states are extremely reluctant to
acknowledge a right of self-determination for internal groups others than
indigenous peoples (178). As seen above, the states involved in the crisis did
not use the terms 'Albanian people' nor 'self-determination of Kosovo'.
Rather, they spoke about 'self- administration', 'enhanced autonomy' or
'self-government' This language appears to get very close in meaning to
the idea of internal self-determination (in the sense of the right to deal with
one's own affairs), but the word was not used (179). This attitude was
probably motivated by the feeling that the term 'self-determination'
remains too powerfully associated with the idea of independence, so that
the recognition of a right to self-determination could be interpreted by sub-
state groups as a right to secede. Indeed, the declarations of the Kosovar
Albanian leaders indicate that they understood self-determination in this
way. Therefore, rather than trying to weaken the term's established
associations, states chose to use different terms.
As regards the final status of Kosovo, it is true that the Rambouillet
plan, discussed below, provides that :
(three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international
meeting should be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement
for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant
authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agree-
ment, and the Helsinki Final Act)) (180).
The words 'will of the people' could at first sight be interpreted as entail-
ing external self-determination. However, it only appears as one of several
elements to be taken into account, rather than as the main element to be
balanced with other factors. Furthermore, it is not clear which people's will
is to be taken into account; the 'people of Kosovo' would be the most
likely, but it could also be the people of Serbia or of the entire FRY. Nor
is it mentioned what mechanism is to be used to determine the will of the
people; a referendum seems most appropriate, but this is not expressly
(178) Note that the distinction between 'minorities' and 'indigenous peoples' raises con-
troversies. On this point, see T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 588-590.
(179) M.K. Albright also affirmed that the goal of the Contact Group draft political settle-
ment was #to help the people of Kosovo to get control over their own affairs now, while giving
them and Belgrade the opportunity to revisit the final status of the province in the future )
(statement to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium, December 8, 1998, emphasis added.
Source : see supra note 108). Such expression does not appear in Contact Group statements, nor
in EU statements.
(180) Interim Agreement on Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Chapter 8, 1, 3 (emphasis
added). The text of the Rambouillet plan is available on the website of the Balkan Action
Organisation : < http://www.balkanaction.org > (see infra, Part III, Section 1).
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provided for (181). Additionally, the Helsinki Final Act, referred to in the
plan, includes the rule of self-determination as well as the principles of
inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of states.
The ambivalence of the term 'self-determination' renders its use delicate.
It embodies both the notions of the right of peoples to be free from foreign
domination or intervention ('external' self-determination) and their right
to deal with their own affairs ('internal' self-determination). By contrast,
'self- administration', or 'self-government', express only the second idea. In
terms of political desirability, it is far from clear that the adoption of an
ethnic definition of 'people' would have the effect of appeasing conflicts
involving minorities. It is submitted that the equilibrium between the dif-
ferent meanings of the right to self-determination, can be best ensured by
maintaining a single definition of the holder of this right. Indeed, each of
the two possible conceptions of 'people', the territorial one and the ethnic
one, tips the seesaw of the notion of self-determination in another direction.
The ethnic definition of 'people' puts the emphasis on the essential charac-
teristics specific to a certain human group which distinguish it from all
other groups. Therefore, it is first and foremost associated with the notion
of self-determination as the right to separate from others and to define
one's own status. Conversely, the territorial notion of the people is based
on an objective, material element, external to the group itself - the
territory. It can be better developed as an inclusive concept because the
distruction between members and non-members of the group is not an
issue. It leaves room for the unfolding of relations between all the different
communities living in the territory, and the building of a common political
culture (182). The emphasis can be put on the way the population could deal
with its own affairs, rather than on who could take part in this process.
Opening international law to the ethnic definition of people, in order to
bring it into line with popular conceptions, may not only confuse the situa-
tion, but also hamper the strengthening of self-determination in its
democratic sense (183). On the other hand, a truly democratic understand-
ing of the notion of 'people' must take into account the cultural
heterogeneity of every population. As Patrick Thornberry puts it :
((a less majoritarian, more differentiated, participatory and communitarian
meaning of 'people' carries opportunities and few risks if the participation is
genuine and not simply asserted. A mature concept of peoples respects and
incorporates diversity and takes strength from its) (184).
(181) M. Weller asserts that (the delegation of Kosovo obtained certain assurances that this
formula actually established a legal right to hold a referendum of the people of Kosovo s (s The
Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo s, supra note 90, p. 197).
(182) Compare with S. PIERRt-CAPS, supra note 1, and B. BADIE, supra note 60, pp. 47-48.
(183) P. THORNBERRY, s The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination s, in
Modern Law of Self-Determination, supra note 1, pp. 126-128.
(184) P. THORNBERRY, idem, p. 128.
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2. Autonomy as a Means to Ensure Minority Protection
Recently, there has been increasing acknowledgement internationally,
that political autonomy could be an adequate response to the phenomenon
of territorial minorities. However, most states have opposed formal
recognition of a right to autonomy for minorities (a). Nevertheless,
autonomy can serve as a means to implement a whole set of rights, in par-
ticular, the right to participate in public affairs (b).
a) Absence of a Right to Autonomy for Minorities
In the UN as well as in the OSCE and the Council of Europe, all
attempts to introduce a right to dispose of regional institutions in a docu-
ment concerning minorities, have failed. In the UN, before the adoption of
the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities by the General Assembly in 1992 (185),
some proposals in this vein were submitted (186). However, member states
refused to go further than acknowledging minority members # the right to
participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate,
regional level, concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions
in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legisla-
tion)) (187).
Similarly, at the European level, the majority of states strongly opposed
all proposals tending towards the recognition of an obligation to granting
autonomy to territorially concentrated minorities. In the 1990 Copenhagen
Declaration, the OSCE Participating States limited themselves to noting
((the efforts undertaken to establish appropriate local or autonomous
administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territories cir-
cumstances #, as one possible means (to protect and create conditions for
the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of
certain national minorities # (188). The Council of Europe, which undertook
to translate OSCE commitments concerning minorities into legal norms,
was also offered the opportunity to acknowledge a right in this respect. Its
Parliamentary Assembly submitted a proposal of additional protocol to the
(185) Resolution 47/135 adopted, without a vote, on 18 December 1992. Note that this is not
a legally binding instrument.
(186) T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 559-560.
(187) Art. 2, §3.
(188) See also the Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities in Geneva,
1991, IV, § 7. On the proposals submitted at the 1990 Copenhagen Summit, concerning the estab-
lishment of autonomous institutions for territorially concentrated minorities, see T. CHRISTAKIS,
supra note 1, pp. 561-563.
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European Convention on Human Rights on the Rights of National
Minorities (189). Article 11 of this proposal stipulated that :
<in the regions where they are in a majority, the persons belonging to a
national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate
local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the
specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic
legislation of the state ) (190).
The application of this provision was not supposed to be stringent. It did
not necessarily require territorial autonomy; it could also be fulfilled by
personal or cultural autonomy, or a 'special status' (191). It was made
dependent on various factors, such as the historical or territorial situation
and the legislation of the state. Nevertheless, the provision was deemed
unacceptable by the member states of the Council of Europe. The addi-
tional protocol proposed was rejected, article 11 being one of the main
reasons (192), and the document thus remains only a draft, without any
binding force. Yet, the Parliamentary Assembly considers itself bound by
Recommendation 1201 (1993) which includes the draft additional protocol.
In particular, it requires from states wishing to be admitted to the Council
of Europe, to commit themselves to incorporating the principles set forth
in this Recommendation in their legal systems (193), before it will give a
favourable opinion to their admission (194). The Assembly has also
specified, when establishing a system of monitoring the honouring of mem-
(189) Recommendation 1201 (1993). Text and explanatory memorandum in H.R.L.J.,
vol. 14, 1993, pp. 144-146.
(190) The draft Convention for the Protection of Minorities proposed by the 'European Com-
mission for Democracy through Law' (a consultative body of experts created in the framework
of the Council of Europe, also called the 'Venice Commission') also proposed the drawing of a
link between minority protection and local self-government. Article 14 § 2 of this proposal reads
as follows : ( as far as possible, States are to take minorities into account when dividing the
national territory into political and administrative sub-divisions, as well as into constituencies *.
This proposal has been published in The Protection of Minorities, European Commission for
democracy through law, Council of Europe edition (1994). See the comments of G. MALINVERNI,
a The draft Convention for the Protection of Minorities. The Proposal of the European Commis-
sion for Democracy through Law ), H.R.L.J., vol. 12, no 6-7, 1991, pp. 265-269, especially p. 266.
(191) N. LEVRAT, ((Solutions institutionnelles pour soci~t6s plurielles k, supra note 1, p. 75.
(192) C. TABAJDI and P. KovAcs, c La Recommandation 1201, mythe ou rbalit6? ', in
Perspectives d'intigration des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale aux institutions de i'Europe
occidentale, Paris, Montchrestien, 1998, pp. 67-75, at 68-69.
(193) Opinion no 190 on the application by Ukraine for membership of the Council of Europe,
26 September 1995, § 12 (H.R.L.J., vol. 16, 1995, pp. 373-375); Opinion no 191 on the application
by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 27 September 1995, § 9, vii and § 10, iv (idem,
pp. 372-373); Opinion no 193 on the Russian Federation's request for membership of the Council
of Europe, 25 January1996, § 10, iv (H.B.L.J., vol. 16, 1996, pp. 185-187).
(194) Faced with an influx of applications to membership from Eastern and Central
European countries after the fall of the Berlin wall, the Council of Europe has reformed its proce-
dure of admission, ensuring a greater control of national legislation of state candidates. The
Parliamentary Assembly plays a major role in this procedure. See P. BODEAU, L'integration
d6mocratique des pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale s, in Perspective d'intigration..., supra
note 192, pp. 135-167 and J.-F. FLAUSS, <<Les conditions d'admission des pays d'Europe centrale
et orientale au sein du Conseil de l'Europe s, E.J.I.L., 1994, pp. 401-422.
515
JULIE RINGELHEIM
ber state's obligations, that countries which are already members of the
organisation should also comply with this recommendation (195). In addi-
tion, the recommendation has been used as an instrument of reference in
bilateral agreements on good neighbourliness concluded by Central and
Eastern Europe countries (196). However, these treaties have revealed that
article 11 remains highly controversial. Indeed, the Slovak and the
Romanian governments, which have both concluded bilateral treaties of
this sort with Hungary, expressly specified that they did not recognise that
minorities enjoyed any collective rights prescribing the creation of ethni-
cally-based autonomous structures (197).
By contrast with the proposed additional protocol, the Framework-Con-
vention for the Protection of National Minorities adopted by the Council of
Europe in November 1994, confines itself to encouraging state parties to
< create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons
belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in
public affairs, in particular, those affecting them ) (art. 15). However, some
provisions do take into account the phenomenon of 'territorial
minorities' (198). The Convention provides that, <<in areas inhabited by
persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial
numbers ), the Parties shall endeavour to promote, when requested to do
so, ((the use of the minority language in relations between those persons
and the administrative authorities)) (art. 10 (2)). They should also
(195) Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Order no 508 (1995), 4 Honouring of
obligations and commitments by member states of the Council of Europe s, § 7, adopted on
26 April 1995 (H.R.L.J., 1996, vol.17, no 3-6, p. 217). H. KLEBES concludes that Recommenda-
tion 1201 survives in a legal ( grey zone', (e The Council of Europe's Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities ), H.R.L.J., 1995, pp. 92-98, at 97, note 25).
(196) Slovak-Hungarian Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Co-operation, Paris,
19 March 1995, art. 15, 4 (b) (D.A.I., no 11, 1 June 1995, p. 329); Romanian-Hungarian Treaty
on Understanding, Co-operation and Good Neighbourhood, Timisoara, 16 September 1996,
Annexe, § 3 (D.A.I., no 23, 1 December 1996, p. 947); Romanian- Ukrainian Treaty on Good-
Neighbourliness and Friendly Co-operation, Constanza, 2 June 1997, art. 13, § 1 (D.A.I., no 19,
1 October 1997, p. 691).
(197) The 1996 Hungary-Romania Treaty contains an express reservation to this effect. The
Slovak Government introduced an interpretative declaration when ratifying the treaty
(J. WRIGHT, , The Protection of Minority Rights in Europe From Conference to Implementa-
tion n, I J.H.R., 1998, pp. 1-31, p. 23). The 'Venice Commission', asked by the Parliamentary
Assembly to give a legal opinion on Article 11, offered & restrictive interpretation, stressing that
international law cannot oblige states to establish decentralised institutions in favour of
minorities (T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 569-571).
(198) The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages also bears a marked
territorial dimension. Alain Fenet notes that El [la protection s'exerce explicitement ou implicite-
ment dans un cadre territorial restreint, celui avec lequel la minorit6 entretient un rapport
historique et dans lequel elle maintient une pr6sence d6mographique n (e L'Europe et les
minorit6s s, in A. FENET et al., supra note 1, p. 149). F. Albanese even holds that e if we look
carefully at the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages as a whole and certain
provisions [Articles 10 (2), 11 (3) and 14 (2)] of the Framework Convention, we can see that the
concept of local self-government underlies the protection measures proposed s (<< Which Interna-
tional Guarantees for Local Self-Government ? Council of Europe Work ,, in Local self-Govern-
ment..., supra note 155, pp. 304-312, at 309).
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endeavour ('to display traditional local names, street names and other
topographical indications intended for the public also in the minority
language when there is a sufficient demand for such indications)) (art. 11
(3)) and ((to ensure, as far as possible [...] adequate opportunities for being
taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language #
(art. 14 (2)). In Malcolm Shaw's view, it is possible to conclude that (there
can be a territorial dimension to relevant minority rights within the
territorial framework of independent states # (199).
Indeed, the aforementioned provisions apply only in the territory where
persons belonging to the minority represent a substantial part of the pop-
ulation. When this proportion is very high, e.g. 80 % of the population,
these special measures will concern most of the population in the relevant
area. In such a case, the emphasis can shift from the population to the
territory; for almost the whole region, in important fields - namely the
language of the administration and education - will be entitled to dif-
ferent treatment from the rest of the country. For administrative reasons,
there is a strong case in favour of the delegation of certain powers to the
regional level. Added to this, the obligation to create conditions necessary
for effective public participation (art. 15) does not only concern 'cultural
life', but also social and economic life. When a minority is concentrated in
a certain region, all that concerns the region affects them in particular. In
similar circumstances therefore, the establishment of a form of autonomy
or local self-government is a particularly appropriate means to actualise
participation in public affairs.
b) The Right to Effective Participation in Public Affairs
Obviously, the developments just described only concern states which
are parties to the Framework-Convention. However, the right of minority
members to participate in public affairs is spelled out in other international
documents, such as the 1992 General Assembly Declaration and the 1990
Copenhagen Document. As stressed by Nicolas Levrat, in order to be effec-
tive, and not merely formal, this right will usually require the estab-
lishment of specific institutional arrangements (200). Indeed, the Special
Rapporteur for the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and the Protection of Minorities, Asbjorn Eide, has recommended
among other options designed to guarantee the effective political participa-
tion of persons belonging to minorities, < decentralised or local forms of
government or autonomous arrangements on a territorial and democratic
basis, including consultative, legislative and executive bodies chosen
(199) M. SHAW, a Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries ,, E.J.I.L., 1997, pp. 478-507, at
486.
(200) ( Solutions institutionnelles pour societ6s plurielles #, supra note 1, p. 74.
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through free and periodic elections without discrimination ) (201). The
OSCE Copenhagen Document also acknowledges that local or autonomous
administrations constitute < one of the possible means ) to promote the
right of persons belonging to national minorities, to effectively participate
in public affairs (art. 35) (202).
Certainly, neither the General Assembly declaration, nor the OSCE
instruments constitute legally binding documents. However, given its
extensive membership, the principles adopted by OSCE members reflect a
broad international consensus. These standards have, moreover, become a
major reference point on the international scene, in the same vein as the
UN Charter (203). In addition, the right of minority members to take part
in public affairs can be viewed as a special application of the general right
to political participation, which is firmly established in human rights
instruments of universal scope (204). < Among other goals ), notes Henry
Steiner, < autonomy schemes achieve particular, distinctive forms of politi-
cal participation for ethnic minorities # (205). From this perspective,
minority protection can also be linked to the right to self-determination in
its internal, democratic sense. While such a right is vested in the popula-
tion of the country as a whole, the actualisation of this right could assume
different forms in order to match the specific situation and aspirations of
the various components of the population.
*
Autonomy can thus be seen as a means to implement a host of interna-
tionally recognised rights belonging to minority members, in particular the
right to participate in public affairs. As Hurst Hannum suggests, autonomy
is not an end in itself, ( it is a political tool to ensure that other rights and
(201) Special Report on Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive
Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, submitted by Special Rapporteur A. Eide to the UN
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, Add. 4,
Recommendations, § 17 (d), (e) (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34/Add.4, 11 August 1993).
(202) The Document also commits Participating States to ensure, inter alia, that persons
belonging to national minorities ( have adequate opportunities for instruction of their mother or
in their mother tongue, as well as, wherever possible and necessary, for its use before public
authorities [...] (art. 34).
(203) See the observation of A. Bloed, ( Monitoring the CSCE Human Dimension : in Search
of its Effectiveness ), A. BLOED, L. LEICHT, M. NOWAK and A. RoSAS (eds), Monitoring Human
Rights in Europe, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp. 45-97, at 51-52. For instance, in the
Kosovo crisis the Security Council itself affirmed that the solution 4 should be in accordance with
OSCE standards [...] and the Charter of the United Nations * (Resolution 1160 (1999)).
(204) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 21 (G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810
(1948)) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 25. On this point, see
H.J. STEINER, << Political Participation as a Human Right ), Harvard H.R. Y., vol. 1, 1988,
pp. 77-132 and J. SALMON, supra note 147.
(205) << Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities 4,
supra note 160, p. 1546.
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needs are appropriately addressed ) (206). Nevertheless, it is clear that with
international law as it stands, minorities do not have a proper right to
autonomy. The vast majority of states are not prepared to depart from the
traditional individual approach to international protection of minorities.
Territorial autonomy thus remains one of several possible ways to address
the phenomenon of minorities and is always subject to adaptations accord-
ing to the circumstances.
On a different note, one must admit that autonomy solutions for
minorities are not free from ambiguity. They might, indeed, contradict the
general aim of minority protection, understood as that of integrating the
minority within the country in which it lives, while respecting its dif-
ference (207). As Henry Steiner puts it :
<<autonomy arrangements may institute a counter-ideal of not simply
preserving but also locking into place the historical differences among groups.
[...] Iormal legal barriers reinforce the natural tendencies of a group's mem-
bers to look inward and assume only a particular identity, rather than to
experience the tension between the particular and a more diffuse or broader
identity as a citizen or human being# (208).
Moreover, a minority which finds itself in the majority at the regional
level, is susceptible to reproduce dominant or oppressive attitudes towards
smaller groups living in the same region. Further, it has rightly been obser-
ved that ((the geographical definition of an autonomous region cannot be
based on exclusively ethnic criteria. It must necessarily also take historical
and economic factors into consideration a (209).
Yet, in certain circumstances, autonomy can appear to be the most
appropriate means to implement international minority protection. The
case of Kosovo could be a good illustration of the factors creating such cir-
cumstances; the demographic situation (a minority concentrated in a
defined territory, where it represents more than 80 % of the population),
the legal precedent (the region used to enjoy a far-reaching autonomy) and
historical or political aspects (tensions between the predominant population
of the province and the central authorities of the State). Therefore, it can
be argued that, in such a context, foreign states are entitled to support the
granting of autonomous status to a particular group within an independent
state, as a means of implementing the internationally recognised rights of
persons belonging to minorities, even before the situation degenerates into
armed conflict. Such support would be all the more justified when these
persons are excluded from the political system and are victims of human
rights violations
(206) Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination, supra note 1, p. 474.
(207) S. PIERRt-CAPS, Supra note 1.
(208) (Ideals and Counter-Ideals... ), supra note 160, pp. 1552 and 1554.
(209) G. MALINVERNI, << Local Self-Government... s, in Local Self-Government..., supra
note 155, p. 319.
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However, as seen earlier, third-party states did not refer to minority
protection when expressing support for the autonomy of Kosovo. This
attitude may suggest that they did not consider minority protection as suf-
ficient grounds for it, but also that they might not have been keen on
establishing a precedent suggesting that minorities do have a right to
autonomy. Moreover, although they backed autonomy for Kosovo from
early on in the crisis, it is only when the conflict escalated towards a civil
war that Western states engaged themselves actively in the issue. One may
ask, therefore, whether this attitude could reflect the acceptance of a
general principle allowing third-party states or certain international
organisations, when a strife between a government and an ethnic group
takes a violent turn, to urge the government concerned to make changes
to its internal structure, in order to restore peace and security. The assess-
ment of such a hypothesis requires the consideration of international reac-
tions in relation to other ethno-political conflicts.
B. - International Reactions towards
Secessionist Conflicts in the OSCE Area
The survey of international reactions towards secessionist conflicts will be
confined to the OSCE area, in order to clearly delimit the geographic area of
enquiry and to focus on the states which have committed themselves (politi-
cally at least) to respecting the important standards regarding minorities
mentioned above (210). Such conflicts are characterised by a strife between
a government and a national or ethnic group which is claiming independence
or a special political status. Two categories of cases can be discerned. In rela-
tion to the conflicts affecting the Republics of Georgia, Moldova and Azerbai-
jan, OSCE participating states have supported the allocation of autonomy to
the separatist region. However, the political context of these conflicts differ
in important respects from that of the Kosovo crisis (1). By contrast, interna-
tional reactions to the Chechen conflict in the Russian Federation, and the
Kurdish question in Turkey, are much more moderate. Nevertheless, such
reactions include a call for a vague 'political solution' (2).
1. Autonomy as a Means to Resolve Secessionist Conflicts
Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are all torn by secessionist con-
flicts (211). Within the Soviet Union, excepting the Dnestr region (or
(210) As of March 2000, the OSCE has 55 members - the 15 EU members, the 12 CIS mem-
bers, the 3 Baltic States, Albania, Andorra, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Norway,
Poland, Romania, San Marino, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland, the FYROM,
Turkey, as well as Canada and the USA. Yugoslavia was suspended on 8 July 1992.
(211) On the background to these conflicts and the action of the UN and the OSCE, see V.-
Y. GHEBALI, L'OSCE dans l'Europe post-communiste, 1990-1996. Vers une identitg pan-
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Transnistria) in Moldova, all the other separatist entities enjoyed some
form of autonomous status within the republics (212). Shortly after the
Soviet republics became independent in December 1991, these entities
proclaimed their own independence. The ethnic specificity of the popula-
tion of those regions was invoked by separatist leaders as an argument to
justify secession (213). All relevant OSCE declarations (214) and UN
Security Council resolutions (215) strongly reaffirm the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan. At the same time,
these documents also make some recommendations concerning the settle-
ment of those conflicts.
As regards the Abkhaz conflict in Georgia, the Security Council
designated, in October 1993, the situation as a < threat to the maintenance
europienne, Brussels, Bruylant, 1996; B. COPPIETERS (ed.), Contested Borders in the Caucasus,
Brussels, VUB University Press, 1996 (available on Internet : <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/Con-
tBorders/eng/ >). On the conflict in Upper-Karabakh, see V. RAMELOT and E. REMACLE, L'OSCE
et les conflits en Europe, Brussels, GRIP, 1995, pp. 113-133; John J. MARESCA, a Resolving the
Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Lost Opportunities for International Conflict Resolution s, in
C.A. CROCKER and FO. HAMPSON with P. AALL (eds), Managing Global Chaos. Sources of and
Responses to International Conflict, Washington D.C., U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996,
pp. 253-273. On the Abkhaz conflict : B. COPPIETERS, G. NODIA, Y. ANCHABADZE (eds), Georgians
and Abkhazians, the search for a peace settlement, Bundesinstitut ffir ostwissenshafliche und inter-
nationale Studien Sonderveroffentlichung, October 1998.
(212) Abkhazia was an 'autonomous republic' within Georgia while South Ossetia and
Upper-Karabakh were 'autonomous regions' (oblast) - which allowed them cultural
autonomy - in Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively.
(213) The Upper-Karabakh has a dominantly Armenian population (around 80 %), South
Ossetia has a large majority of Ossetians (around 70 %) and the Dnestr region has a slight
majority of Russian inhabitants (53 % of the population), The case of Abkhazia is different. The
Abkhaz population represented only 17 % of the population in the region before the conflict but
were dominant in the local parliament. In spite of the expulsion of a large number of Georgians
from the region during the conflict, the Abkhazs still do not constitute a majority of the reduced
population that remains. See the Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in
Abkhazia, Georgia, 3 March 1994, S/1994/253, § 28. According to Ghia Nodia, the conflicts in
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria arose due to the fact that the
a newly independent states contained disputed territories, which were claimed by different ethnic
communities as 'theirs' s, more than from ( the alleged mistreatment of minorities by the
majority s. However, a [mstreatment of or discrimination against minorities were used by the
advocates of secessionism in order to mobilize their own communities or to gain recognition for
their cause from the international community ) (0 Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic
Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia s, in Contested Borders in the Caucasus, supra note 211).
(214) CSCE Rome Summit, Decisions on regional issues, December 1993 (D.A.I., no 3,
1 February 1994, pp. 47-48); Budapest Summit Declaration, December 1994, II (D.A.I., no 3,
1995, 1 February 1995, pp. 92-94); Lisbon Summit Declaration, December 1996 (D.A.I., no 4,
15 February 1997, p. 150), Copenhagen Summit, 19 December 1997 (D.A.I, 1998, no 4, pp. 132-
135, p. 135). See also Istanbul Summit Declaration, November 1999 (SUM.DOC/2/99). See also
the Joint statement of the U.S. President B. Clinton and the President of Georgia,
E. Shevardnadze, Washington, 7 March 1994 (D.A.I., no 10, 15 May 1994, pp. 231-232); the posi-
tion of the French Government in , Pratique frangaise du droit international *, A.F.D.I., 1992,
p. 1116, 1993, p. 1017, 1994, p. 1026, 1997, p. 928; and the position of the UK Government in
o UK Materials on International Law, 1997 s, B. Y.I.L., 1997, p. 516.
(215) The Security Council has adopted resolution on the Abkhaz conflict in Georgia : Res.
876 (1993), 896 (1994), 906 (1994), 937 (1994), 977 (1995), 993 (1995), 1036 (1996), 1077 (1996),
1096 (1997), 1124 (1997), 1225 (1999), 1255 (1999); and on the Upper-Karabakh conflict in Azer-
baijan : Res. 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993).
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of international peace and security)) (216). From 1994 onwards, it has
repeatedly urged ((the parties to resume the negotiations [...] and to achieve
substantive progress towards a political settlement, including on the politi-
cal status of Abkhazia, respecting fully the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of Georgia)) (217). It has expressed its support for
the efforts of the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the OSCE repre-
sentatives, to carry forward the peace process. The peace plan that was
submitted to the parties in April 1994 proposed the creation of a < Union
State, within the borders of the former Georgian Soviet Socialist
Republic #. Outside the enumerated areas of joint competence, Abkhazia
would have enjoyed the full measure of state power (218). The Abkhaz side,
however, has declined to sign any document that would include recognition
of Georgia's territorial integrity (219). Similarly, with respect to the conflict
in South Ossetia, also affecting Georgia, the OSCE mission has recom-
mended the establishment of the highest possible degree of political
autonomy. The Georgian government has accepted the principle of granting
a status of political autonomy to the region, but the leaders of South
Ossetia continue to demand recognition of their independence (220).
In the case of Upper-Karabakh (or Nagorus-Karabakh), the
predominantly Armenian region in Azerbaijan, the OSCE members (with
the exception of the Republic of Armenia) formally endorsed the basic prin-
ciples for a settlement of the conflict recommended by the President of the
'Minsk Group' (221). These principles include the respect for the territorial
integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan; the legal status of Nagorno-
Karabakh to be defined in an agreement based on self-determination,
providing Nagorno-Karabakh with autonomy to the highest degree possible
within Azerbaijan and finally, the guaranteed security for Nagorno-
Karabakh and its whole population (222). As for the Security Council, it
(216) Resolution 876 (1993), 19 October 1993, Preamble, § 6.
(217) Resolution 906 (1994), 25 March 1994, § 4, emphasis added. Compare with Resolu-
tion 896 (1994), 31 January 1994, § 5. On the reaction of the Security Council and the OSCE to
the Abkhaz conflict, see 0. PAYE and E. REMACLE, s UN and CSCE Policies in Transcaucasia s,
in Contested Borders in the Caucasus, supra note 211; T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 215-218.
(218) Report of the Secretary- General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 3 May
1994, S/1994/529, Annex II, § 3 (4).
(219) Report of the Secretary-General, 3 May 1994, S/1994/529, § 15.
(220) V.-Y. GHEBALI, supra note 211, pp. 276-277 and 607-608. At the OSCE Istanbul Sum-
mit (November 1999), Participating States have stressed i the need for solving the conflicts with
regard to the Tskhinvali regions/South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia, particularly by defining
the political status of these regions within Georgia s, SUM.DOC/2/99, § 15, emphasis added. Com-
pare with earlier statements on the South Ossetia conflict, in particular the Rome Summit Decla-
ration (1993), Budapest Summit Declaration (1994), Copenhagen Summit Declaration (1997).
(221) The 'Minsk Group' is an informal body, composed of diplomats from several Participat-
ing States, created by the OSCE to run the negotiation process in this conflict.
(222) Declaration of the Chairman in Office of the OSCE, Lisbon Summit, 2 December 1996,
Final declaration, Annex I (D.A.I., n" 4, 15 February 1997, p. 150). See also the statement of the
UK Government spokesman, in s UK Materials on International Law , B. Y.I.L., 1997, pp. 516-
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stated in its first resolution on the issue that the situation endangered
'peace and security in the region' and urged the parties concerned to
resume negotiations within the framework of the peace process of the Minsk
Group of the CSCE (223). However, both parties have rejected the plan
proposed by the OSCE mediator (224).
By the same token, the OSCE participating states endorsed, at the 1993
Rome Summit, the plan drafted by the OSCE mission in Moldova, which
envisaged a high degree of autonomy for the secessionist region of Trans-
nistria (225). However, this plan had been previously accepted by the
Republic of Moldova itself. Accordingly, its new Constitution of 1994 estab-
lished a special autonomous status for the Dnestr region (226). Nonetheless,
the separatist leaders still want recognition of the independence of Trans-
nistria (227).
It can be observed that, in all these cases, the OSCE members did not
content themselves with reasserting the territorial integrity of the State.
They also called the parties to negotiate a special status for the secessionist
region. Additionally, all the peace proposals put forward by international
mediators, whose efforts are encouraged by the OSCE and the Security
Council, point toward allocating a large autonomy for the rebellious
regions. One can thus conclude that these two institutions consider them-
selves entitled to support solutions of autonomy - even though they imply
a restructuring of the country - when it is aimed at settling a civil
war (228). This denotes an evolution towards a more extensive interpreta-
tion of the scope of their action in the resolution of internal conflicts.
Yet, one must be cautious when drawing conclusions from this brief sur-
vey. In fact, the promotion of a special status in the contexts of Georgia,
Moldova and Azerbaijan appears primarily designed to reconcile the control
the separatists managed to acquire on the contested territory, with the will
to preserve the territorial integrity of states. The political context of these
cases thus differs in important respects from the Kosovo crisis. Indeed, in
517 and of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Pratique frangaise du droit international
A.F.D.I., 1997, p. 928 and D.A.I., no 2, 15 January 1996.
(223) Resolution 822 (1993), 30 April 1993, Preamble and § 2. On the reaction of the Security
Council to the Upper-Karabakh conflict, see 0. PAYE and E. REMACLE, supra note 211.
(224) The Armenian side deemed it unsatisfactory while Azeri authorities considered it too
far-reaching. See V.-Y. GHEBALI, supra note 211, pp. 605-606. Another plan, presented in May
1997 was rejected by the leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, because it merely advocated autonomy
and discounted achievement of independence (Keesing's, May 1997, p. 41710 and p. 41835). See
also CSCE Summit, Rome, 1 December 1993, §26, decisions on regional issues (D.A.I., no 3,
1 February 1994, p. 48).
(225) Keesing's, Febuary 1994, p. 39876.
(226) Keesing's, July 1994, p. 40110. On the 1994 Moldova's Constitution, see A. BAR-
BANEAGRA, ((The situation in Moldova ), in Local Self-Government..., supra, note 155, pp. 187-188.
(227) V. -Y. GHEBALI, supra note 211, p. 294. The parties have concluded a 'Memorandum of
understanding on normalising relations between Moldova and the Dnestr region' (Moscow, 8 May
1997, Keesing's, May 1997, p. 41660). Text in D.A.I., no 17, 1 September 1997, p. 628.
(228) T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, p. 572.
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the three aforementioned republics, the secessionist leaders are in a position
of force vis-a-via the state, while the Kosovar Albanians did not succeed in
supplanting the FRY's authority in the province. Georgia and Moldova
have both offered a far-reaching status of autonomy to, respectively,
Abkhazia (229) and South Ossetia (230), and the Dnestr region (231). These
offers have, however, been rebuffed by the separatist leaders. Furthermore,
Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan have all accepted, if not requested, the
involvement of the OSCE or the UN in the resolution of their conflict. By
contrast, the FRY was more than reluctant to allow any international par-
ticipation in the settlement of the Kosovo issue (232).
2. An Obligation to Negotiate?
The international reactions towards the Chechen conflict in the Russian
Federation and the Kurdish question in Turkey, are much more moderate
than towards the conflicts affecting the three former Soviet Republics. The
UN Security Council has not taken any resolution on these two issues,
while the OSCE has made certain statements on the Chechen conflict, but
has ignored the Kurdish problem.
In January 1995, reacting to the offensive against the separatist Chechen
Republic launched by the Russian Federation in late 1994 (233), the OSCE
Permanent Council adopted a resolution demanding the cessation of
hostilities and the opening of negotiations in order to achieve a political
settlement to the crisis, respecting the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation and its Constitution (234). The EU member states expressed a
similar position (235).
(229) Report of the UN Secretary- General, 29 October 1998, S/1998/1012, § 8. See also the
statement of the Georgian President at the United Nations, dated 9 March 1994 (D.A.I., no 9
1 May 1994).
(230) V.-Y. GHEBALI, 8supra note 211, p. 276.
(231) A. BARBANEAGRA, ((The situation in Moldova ,, in Local Self-Government..., supra
note 155, pp. 187-188.
(232) See note 23 and 36. The OSCE had established long-term missions in Kosovo, Sandjak
and Voijvodina, but the FRY's authorities did not renew their authorisation to these missions
after July 1993. The OSCE repeatedly asked for the return of these missions (Rome Summit Dec-
laration, 1 December 1993, D.A.I., no 3, 1 February 1994, p. 47; Summary of the President,
Budapest Summit, 8 December 1995, D.A.I., no 4, 15 February 1996, p. 150; Lisbon Summit
Declaration, 2 December 1996, § 19, D.A.I., n" 4, 15 February 1997, p. 148). The Contact Group
also called for the FRY to allow the return of the OSCE missions (London 9 March 1998, § 6;
Rome 29 April 1998, § 6(b); Bonn, 8 July 1998, § 13).
(233) The Chechen conflict also dates back to the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 1992,
Chechnya - autonomous Republic within Russia - refused to sign the Federation Treaty, as
it claimed independence (Keesings, 1992, p. 38826). See V.-Y. GHEBALI, supra note 211, pp. 312-
323 and 612-613; T. GAZZINI, (Considerations on the conflict in Chechnya s, H.R.L.J., 1996,
pp. 93-105.
(234) It also specified that the issue was not an internal affair, due to the violations of OSCE
principles (Vienna January 12, D.A.I., n' 6, 15 March 1995, §3 and 4). Given the new military
campaign launched in September 1999 by the Russian government, the OSCE Participating
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As for the Kurdish population, concentrated in the Southeast of Turkey,
it never enjoyed any formal autonomous regime in Turkey. The 'Kurdish
question' dates back to the beginning of the Turkish State. Until 1990, the
Turkish authorities refused to acknowledge even the existence of the Kurds
as a distinct population, and the public use of the Kurdish language was
prohibited. The Kurds have been the victim of discriminations and
numerous violations of human rights. In particular, in 1991-1992, the
terrorist campaigns led by the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) pursuing
independence, triggered bombings and violent reprisals from the Turkish
authorities (236). The reaction of the EU countries consisted of reaffirming
the territorial integrity of Turkey, condemning terrorism, and demanding
the respect of human rights and the rule of law. However, they have also
invited Turkey to seek a political solution to the Kurdish problem (237).
The most recent statements seem to give more weight to the demands of
the Kurds; for instance, the Council President Joschka Fischer, speaking
on the behalf of the Fifteen, declared that ( the Turkish Government
should be encouraged to seek a political solution to this problem and to
recognise the legitimate cultural rights of the Kurds > (238).
States have reiterated their call for a political solution ), at the Istanbul Summit, in November
1999 (Istanbul Summit declaration, SUM.DOC/2/99, § 23).
(235) Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU concerning Chechnya, Brussels,
17 January 1995 (D.A.I., no 5, 1 March 1995); Declaration of the EU Presidency, 3 April 1995
(Agence Europe, no 6454, 3 April 1995); Declaration of the Irish Presidency of the EU (Agence
Europe, no 6789, 12 August 1996); European Union statement (Agence Europe no 6797,
26 August 1996). See also the declaration of the French Foreign Affairs Minister (A.F.D.I., 1996,
p. 1038) and of UK officials (B. YI.L., 1996, pp. 720 and 761). Note, however, the response of
the Government spokesman in the House of Lords to . question raising the issue of the right
to self-determination in relation to Chechnya : e In international law, the right of self-determina-
tion is recognised and specifically in international covenants [...] which the United Kingdom has
ratified, However, the exercise of the right must also take into account questions such as what
constitutes . separate people and respect of the principle [of] territorial integrity of the unitary
state. In the case of Chechnya no country has recognised President Dudayev's unilateral declara-
tion of independence, but we have repeatedly called on the Russians to work for a political solu-
tion which would allow the Chechen people to express their identity within the framework of the
Russian federation * (B. Y.I.L., 1995, p. 621, emphasis added).
(236) H. HANNUM, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self Determination, supra note 1, pp. 178-202
and 484-485.
(237) Declaration of the European Presidency on Customs Union with Turkey, Tuesday,
14 February 1995 (Agence Europe, no 1924, 28 February 1995); EC-Turkey Association Council
(Agence Europe, no 6968, 5 May 1997); Declaration of the EU Presidency on behalf of the
European Union (Agence Europe, no 6978, 22 May 1997).
(238) Agence Europe, no 7461, 8 May 1999. See also the General Affairs Council meeting,
8 December 1998 (Agence Europe, no 7359, 9 December 1998). On a recent occasion, the German
Secretary of State Ludger Volmer reportedly even declared : a The Kurds are entitled to their
cultural identity and a certain autonomy, and Turkey has the right to territorial integrity #
(Brussels, 24 February 1999, Agence Europe, no 7412, 25 February 1999, emphasis added). Some
analysts have also discerned a change in the US government's stance towards the fate of Kurds
in Turkey. American officials have recently called for the respect of human rights, including
cultural and linguistic rights (The Economist, 27 November 1999). During a visit in Turkey in
August 1999, the US Assistant Secretary of State for democracy, human rights and labour has,
indeed, declared that the Kurds should be allowed cultural and linguistic rights (Keesings,
August 1999, p. 43111).
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Nonetheless, neither in the case of the Kurds in Turkey, nor in the case
of Chechnya, did EU or OSCE official statements refer to a 'special status'
or 'autonomy'. The moderation of the language used in these latter cases,
in comparison with that observed in the cases of conflicts affecting Georgia,
Moldova and Azerbaijan, seems to result from the difference of political
context. Indeed, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey are
much more reluctant to allow international involvement in the Chechen
conflict and the Kurdish problem respectively. Moreover, the situation of
the Kurds in Turkey differ from all the other cases, because they neither
enjoyed formal autonomy nor succeeded in establishing control over a cer-
tain territory. Against this background, the attitude of the OSCE member
states in the Kosovo crisis proves to be exceptional : they required the
FRY's government to grant autonomy, notwithstanding the failure of the
Kosovar Albanians to impose their authority on the province, and the
refusal of the Yugoslav authorities to accept international involvement in
the issue.
On the other hand, even in relation to the issues of Chechnya and the
Kurds, states went further than reasserting the territorial integrity and
condemning the violation of human rights; they called for negotiations and
the search for a political solution to the conflict. This appears to be the true
common element of the international positions in all cases mentioned
hitherto. In the Kosovo crisis too, foreign states primarily insisted that
Yugoslavia had to offer a real political dialogue to the representatives of
the Albanian community. Similarly, with respect to Georgia, Moldova and
Azerbaijan, OSCE participating states have first and foremost urged the
parties to negotiate. They admited that the peace plans they promoted
were only proposals and that the settlement had to be agreed by the parties
themselves (239). These repeated calls for a political settlement in different
contexts, despite their rhetorical character, suggest that OSCE members
increasingly consider that a state affected by an internal conflict is under
an obligation to endeavour to settle the problem peacefully, through politi-
cal accommodation.
To sum up, international law as it stands today does not enshrine a right
to autonomy for minorities. However, states admit that in case of internal
conflict, the Security Council, but also regional organisations for the peace-
ful settlement of conflicts, such as the OSCE, are entitled to support the
establishment of a form of autonomy, as a means of restoring peace and
(239) See, for example, the statement by Chirac, Clinton and Yeltsin on Upper-Karabakh,
when presenting the plan drafted by the Minsk Group (Denver, 20 June 1997, D.A.I., no 15.
1 August 1997, p. 524).
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stability in the region. Yet, as the reactions towards the Chechen conflict
and the Kurdish question in Turkey suggest, it seems that such support
presupposes that the state concerned has previously accepted the involve-
ment of international organisations in the settlement of the conflict.
Indeed, the case of Kosovo appears to be the only conflict in the OSCE
area in which foreign states have demanded the central government to
establish a special status for a certain region within its national territory,
in spite of the resistance of that government towards the participation of
international representatives to the resolution of the issue. It remains to be
seen whether such a stance will be reiterated in other conflicts in the future.
From a political standpoint, it is important to emphasise that a 'special
status' designed to end a secessionist conflict would respond to different
imperatives than an autonomy stemming from the rights of persons belong-
ing to minorities. In the former case, the primary aim of the autonomous
status is to restore peace and stability. In order to obtain the consent of
the separatists, such status must take into account the degree of control
they have achieved over the contested territory. Consequently, such settle-
ment will be focused on one particular group, while other minorities in the
same country, in a weaker position, risk being neglected. This may also
raise concerns about the fate of sub-minorities living in the region.
Moreover, linking autonomy to conflict resolution, rather than to minority
protection, may have disturbing political implications. It could encourage
minorities to resort to force, if it is the only way to obtain international
support for their political aspirations, when the state refuses to negotiate
with them.
However, some additional legal conclusions can be drawn from the
developments examined in this section. The international reactions in all
the conflicts mentioned above demonstrate a clear consensus among states
that, in case of separatist conflicts, both parties can be required to
negotiate in order to settle the dispute peacefully. Of course, states have
the right to defend their territorial integrity and, if necessary, to use force
for this purpose. Nonetheless, the use of force within internal borders is
already limited by international obligations (240). Moreover, in the case of
conflict between a government and an ethnic minority, a possible obliga-
(240) Even in the case of civil emergency, police and military forces conducting security mis-
sions must respect the fundamental human rights of the population. This obligation stems from
international human rights treaties, but has been developed and specified in the Code of conduct
on politico-military aspects of security adopted by OSCE participating states at the Budapest
Summit in 1994. This only politically-binding document (art. 39) stipulates in particular that, if
recourse to force cannot be avoided, it must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement
(VIII, art. 36). It also prohibits the use of armed forces to limit the peaceful and lawful exercise
of civil rights by persons, or to deprive them of their national, religious, cultural, linguistic or
ethnic identity (VIII, art. 37). Obviously, if the situation degenerates into internal conflict, the
relevant humanitarian norms apply. See E. DAVID, Principes de droit des conflicts arm4s, Brussels,
Bruylant, 1994, pp. 337-345.
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tion to negotiate could be linked to the right of minority members to par-
ticipate in public affairs. Indeed, such a right entails that persons belonging
to a minority should be able to organise themselves politically, in order to
express their collective aspirations. They should have adequate oppor-
tunities to take part in the political process of the country and, if there is
sufficient consensus among them, to negotiate the legal status of the group.
If this right is ignored by the government concerned, other states are
entitled to require the government to respect it. They do not have to wait
until the strife between the government and the group becomes violent and
threatens international stability to take a stand; calling a government to
act in conformity with the internationally recognised rights of persons
belonging to minorities would not be an interference in internal affairs. It
seems possible to add, as submitted in the first part of this section, that
foreign states could also express support for a form of autonomy when,
given the circumstances, such a regime appears to be the most appropriate
way to implement a whole set of rights for persons belonging to minorities.
Yet, such support can only be subsidiary to the primary requirement of a
negotiation between the government concerned and minority repre-
sentatives.
In any case, autonomy remains a variable concept. The content and
limits of such a regime always depend on the circumstances and on the
negotiations between the parties concerned. It is submitted, however, that
international law also provides certain guidelines concerning the shaping of
an autonomous status within a state. The analysis of the peace plan
negotiated in Rambouillet can furnish a basis for the discussion of this con-
tention.
III. - THE POLITICAL WAY OUT OF THE CONFLICT
NEITHER MERE AUTONOMY, NOR FULL INDEPENDENCE
From October 1998, Western diplomats made several attempts to con-
vince the parties to the conflict to agree on a plan of autonomy for
Kosovo (241). The draft of the Rambouillet plan was prepared by the Con-
tact Group and modified throughout the conference, in an attempt to
accommodate demands from both sides. Although the final text was only
signed by the Albanian representatives, it was already the result of a com-
promise between the Albanian and the Yugoslav/Serbian positions (242).
An examination of the discrepancies between the latter plan and the
Yugoslav/Serb counter-proposal, can illustrate to what extent international
(241) M. WELLER, a The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo ,, supra note 90, pp. 218-221.
Note that Marc Weller was a legal advisor of the Kosovo Albanian delegation in Rambouillet.
(242) The text of the plan. and the Serbian counter-proposal, can be found on the website
of the Balkan Action organisation : < http://www.balkanaction.org >.
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law may condition the shaping of an autonomous status (A). On the other
hand, the functioning of an autonomy normally requires co-operation
between the autonomous institutions and the central authorities. The
arrangement finally reached after the NATO military action however, pur-
ports to implement a form of autonomy without the participation of the
central government. As a result, the present status of Kosovo according to
international law remains highly ambiguous (B).
A. - The Rambouillet Plan
The plan submitted to the delegations at Rambouillet proposed the
establishment of new autonomous institutions in Kosovo (1), which had to
be guaranteed by a NATO military presence (2).
1. Political Aspects (243)
The new constitution proposed for Kosovo in the Interim Agreement for
Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, states in its Preamble that its basic
purpose is < to ensure respect for human rights and the equality of all
citizens and national communities # and < to establish institutions of
democratic self-government in Kosovo, grounded in respect for the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and from this Agreement, from which the authorities of governance set
forth herein originate # (244). The draft plan provides for the establishment
of a locally elected assembly, a government, a president, and an independ-
ent local judiciary, including a Constitutional and a Supreme Court. The
Kosovo organs would be granted extensive political, security, economic,
and social responsibilities, including the power to conduct foreign relations
within its areas of responsibility (245). The province would be represented
in Federal and Serbian institutions. On the other hand, the FRY
authorities would have competence in Kosovo over the areas traditionally
reserved to central authorities (monetary policy, defense, foreign policy,
customs services, etc.) (246). They would be precluded from modifying the
Constitution of Kosovo, set forth in the Agreement, or the laws adopted by
the Kosovo Assembly (247). The autonomy provided for Kosovo is thus
very extensive and amounts in effect to the status of a federal unit (248).
(243) See the Chapter I of the Agreement - 'Constitution'.
(244) Chapter 1, Preamble, § 2.
(245) Chapter 1, art. 1, § 6 (c).
(246) Chapter 1, art. I, § 3.
(247) Chapter 1, art. II, § 5
(248) See 0. CORTEN, <<Tous les moyens diplomatiques avaient-ils rhellement ete 6puisis?
L'6chec du 'plan de Rambouillet' s, in B. ADAM (ed.), La guerre du Kosovo, iclairages et commen-
taires, Bruxelles, GRIP-Complexe, 1999 pp. 32-42. According to Olivier Corten, the powers con-
ferred by the Rambouillet plan to Kosovo were wider than the powers of the Republics of Mon-
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But the peculiarity of the political arrangement proposed at Rambouillet
lies in the special importance given to the communes and the national com-
munities. The commune, defined as the < basic territorial unit of local self-
government ), would have responsibility, in addition to the specific matters
enumerated, for all areas within Kosovo's authority not expressly assigned
elsewhere (249). Moreover, the draft agreement attaches considerable
emphasis to national communities, treated as one basic element of the
political system envisaged. The Preamble of the Constitution states that
< the institutions of Kosovo should fairly represent the national com-
munities in Kosovo, and foster the exercise of their rights and those of their
members # (250). The plan includes provisions to ensure special representa-
tion of national communities in the assembly (251), the government (252),
and the communal institutions (253), as well as in the Constitutional and
Supreme Courts (254). Furthermore, each national community would be
entitled to set up its own institutions in order to administer its own
affairs (255). Interestingly, the draft agreement also proposes the estab-
lishment of a type of personal jurisdiction in favour of Serbia; citizens and
national communities would have the right to call upon appropriate
institutions of the Republic of Serbia for certain purposes, such as school
curricula or social benefits programmes, with the exception of police and
security matters (256).
Compared to this plan, the Yugoslav/Serbian counter-proposal reduces
the powers of the Kosovo institutions, cancelling in particular all elements
tending to give the region the status of a federal entity (257). In addition,
it accentuates further the influence of national communities in the political
system. This is particularly striking if one examines the way the organisa-
tion of the assembly is envisaged in each document. The Yugoslav/Serbian
proposal stipulates that, among 130 seats, all national communities,
namely Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Romanies, Egyptians, Goranies and
tenegro and Serbia. In his view, the plan was incompatible with the 1992 Yugoslav Constitution.
It must be noted, however, that many features of the autonomy provided for in the plan were
similar to the status Kosovo enjoyed under the 1974 Constitution of the Autonomous Province of
Kosovo, in the former Yugoslavia.
(249) Chapter 1, Art. VIII, § 5. This feature recalls the 'cantonal' system established by the
Dayton Agreement for the Bosno-Croatian federation, which led to the creation of ethnically
homogenous or dominated cantons (H. POULTON, Minorities in Southeast Europe, supra note 42,
p. 24; J. MARKO, < The Ethno-National Effects of Territorial Delimitation in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina s, Local self-Government..., supra note 155, pp. 189-212).
(250) § 3.
(251) Chapter 1, Art. II, § 1.
(252) Chapter 1, Art. IV, § 1(a).
(253) Chapter 1, Art. VIII, § 3.
(254) Chapter 1, Art. V, § 5 and § 9.
(255) Chapter 1, Art. VII.
(256) Chapter 1, Art. 1, § 7.
(257) Serbian Counter- Proposal, Chapter 1, Art. 1, § 1 (source see supra note 242). Kosmet
is the Serbian term for Kosovo (see supra note 2).
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Muslim Slavs, should be represented by at least five deputies each. In other
words, the five latter communities, which amount altogether to around 2 %
of the Kosovo's population (258), would be represented by approximately
20 % of the members of the assembly. The Rambouillet final draft retains
the principle of special representation for national minorities, but adds a
double-threshold system. Eighty members would be directly elected by the
citizens, while among the 40 remaining seats, 10 would be proportionally
divided among communities whose members constitute between 0.5 % and
5 % of the Kosovo population, and 30 seats would be divided equally
among the communities corresponding to more than 5 % of the Kosovo
population, presumably the Serbian and the Albanian national com-
munities (259). Moreover, the Yugoslav/Serbian plan proposes to confer
upon every group of deputies elected by a national minority, the power to
veto the 'regulations' of the assembly when it deems that it contradicts its
,vital national interest' Again, the Rambouillet final draft retains the
mechanism but attempts to restrict its scope; the 'vital national interest'
veto would be provided only to representatives of the national communities
corresponding to more than 5 % of the population, and be subject to addi-
tional conditions and to a more elaborate procedure of mediation (260).
*
This brief picture of the political settlement proposed at Rambouillet
suggests an attempt to conciliate a far-reaching autonomy with particular
devices based on 'ethnic' factors. Is it possible to comment on this plan
from an international law perspective? As a rule, international law leaves
states the discretion over the organisation of their internal structure (261).
However, this discretion has been limited by the development of interna-
tional human rights law. Once again, two concepts emerge as particularly
important in this context; self-determination in its internal, democratic
sense and minority rights (262).
(258) See supra note 39.
(259) Chapter 1, Art. II, § 1.
(260) Chapter 1, Art. II, §§ 7-8.
(261) See the Western Sahara case, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1975, § 94 and Military
and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua, ICJ Reports, 1986, § 258.
(262) Of course, the Rambouillet agreement does not purport to be based on 'self-determina-
tion', but rather on 'self-government' However, there is no reason why those principles, that
a state is required to respect at a national level should cease to apply at a regional level to the
autonomous institutions of the region. Yet, the applicability of international rules on minority
protection to 'regional minorities' is contested (see Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntyre v.
Canada, Communication no 359/1989 and 385/1989, Report of the Human Rights Committee,
31 March 1993, GAOR, 48th Sess., Suppl. no 40). Nonetheless, it is a well-known phenomenon
that, when a region is endowed with a large autonomy, a group which finds itself in the minority
at the regional level, although it is not in this situation at the national level, may be the victim
of policy of assimilation or discrimination. Therefore, the ratio juris of minority rights suggests
that such protection should also apply at the regional level, to 'sub-minorities' See A. EIDE,
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The UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), indeed, suggests that
the principle of self-determination requires states to possess a ((government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or colour ) (263). it is true that s such a requirement does
not imply that the only government that can be deemed 'representative'
is one that explicitly recognises all of the various ethnic, religious,
linguistic, and other communities within a state # (264). However, com-
bined with the right of minority members to recognition of their identity
and their right to participate in public affairs, this provision could be con-
strued as entailing a positive obligation to have a constitution granting, in
accordance with the specificity of each country, the representation of all
the components of the population (265). Indeed, adjustments to the politi-
cal system to frame and enhance co-operation between the different
segments of the population in heterogeneous societies, have become
increasingly common. These forms of political system have been theorised
as instances of 'consociational democracy' Arend Lijphart, the most
prominent analyst of this model, has stressed that these systems are
characterised by ((deviations from pure majority rule ), like mutual veto or
concurrent majority mechanisms (266). The problem is that those devices,
if taken too far, can subvert democracy itself. According to Lijphart's
theory, they are aimed at allowing the political participation of < all signifi-
cant segments of the plural society ) (267). In Kosovo, the imbalance
between the different communities is such that granting very small com-
munity groups (some representing around 0,5 % of the population) some-
thing that amounts to the power of co-decision, would entail a distortion
in the representation of the population, diluting the voice of the majority
and risking paralysis of the functioning of the institutions. In fact, the
spirit of the Yugoslav/Serbian counter-proposal goes further than accom-
modating the majority rule. It tends to replace democratic legitimacy,
based on fair representation of the population as a whole, with an 'ethnic'
(Territorial Integrity of States, Minority Protection and Guarantees for Autonomy
Arrangements ), in Local Self-Government..., supra note 155, p. 301. Indeed, the Rambouillet
draft states that ((Kosovo shall govern itself democratically ( (Chapter 1, Art. I, § 1) and that
(national communities and their members shall have additional rights [...] in accordance with
international standards [...] s (Chapter 1, Art. VII, § 1).
(263) §7.
(264) H. HANNUM, ( Rethinking Self-Determination ), supra note 1, p. 17.
(265) A. EIDE, <(Territorial Integrity of States, Minority Protection and Guarantees for
Autonomy Arrangements s, in Local Self-Government..., supra note 155, pp. 294-300. This is close
to the view expressed by Ian Brownlie on self-determination : he maintains that this concept has
a ( core of reasonable certainty ) which consists in ( the right of a community which has a distinct
character to have this character reflected in the institutions of government under which it lives '
(c The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law c, in The Rights of Peoples, supra note 1,
p. 5).
(266) Democracy in Plural Societies, A Comparative Exploration, New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1977, p. 36.
(267) Idem, p. 25, emphasis added.
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legitimacy which rests on the representation of each ethnic group, rather
than individuals. A system which makes 'ethnicity' the central and
primary organising principle of the state structure would appear to con-
tradict the provision of the Resolution 2625 (XXV). In effect, the general
principle of fair representation of the population without distinction would
not just be tempered by some mechanisms designed to promote the politi-
cal participation of substantial non-dominant groups, but actually over-
ruled.
The arrangement discussed at Rambouillet mirrors many of the features
of the political system within the former Yugoslavia. Such imbalance
between the representation of citizens as individuals and as members of
national communities, was precisely described by political analysts as one
of the major defects of this system. In this view, the institutions of the for-
mer Yugoslavia were so entirely shaped according to divisions among
national communities, that they did not permit the development of a com-
mon political culture transcending those distinctions (268). Significantly,
citizens were not directly represented in the federal structures; they had
their interests represented, if at all, only by the republic in which they
lived (269). More generally, the former Yugoslav regime did not guarantee
individual political and civil rights, which could have counter-balanced the
extensive collective rights recognised in relation to national communities.
This point has been emphasised by Catherine Lutard :
( Dans la Yougslavie de Tito, la seule fagon de se distinguer, de s'affirmer
face au pouvoir central 6tait de d6fendre des droits collectifs, ceux de son
peuple, de sa nationalit6. Seul ce type de droits 6tait pris en compte par le
systeme, au d6triment des droits individuels, qui auraient impliqu6 une
v6ritable d6mocratisation du systeme s (270).
The Rambouillet draft agreement attempts to redress these problems. It
provides for a direct representation of citizens in addition to representation
of national minorities. It also provides for the protection of internationally
recognised individual rights and freedoms. In particular, the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
its Protocols would become directly applicable in the province (271). Those
rights and freedoms would have priority over all other laws (272). However,
(268) S.L. Woodward emphasises that e [d]ecentralisation by the early 1970s had led to so
much de facto independence that political life was primarily centred in the republics b
(S.L. WOODWARD, eupra note 10, p. 40).
(269) Idem, p. 85. In addition, the republics had the power to block any decision in the
federal institutions. Indeed, a [t]he system of federal decisionmaking by consensus and veto had
no procedure for resolving differences between truly incompatible projects * (idem, p. 84).
(270) C. LUTARD, 8upra note 5, pp. 44-45.
(271) Art. VI, § 2. Other internationally recognised human rights instruments would have to
be enacted into law by the Kosovo Assembly, in order to become applicable in the province
(ibidem).
(272) The plan also stipulates that any amendments to the Constitution diminishing those
rights would be precluded (Art. X).
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at the time of the Rambouillet conference the political situation in Kosovo
was such that there were strong reasons to believe that the proposed politi-
cal system would not have functioned without very special guarantees.
2. Implementation System : the International Military Presence
The primary distinguishing feature of a 'consociational democracy',
Lijphart argues, lies in < elite cooperation ) (273). < Consociational
democracy entails the co-operation by segmental leaders in spite of the
deep cleavages separating the segments. This requires that the leaders feel
at least some commitment to the maintenance of the unity of the country
as well as a commitment to democratic practices s (274). These elements
were precisely lacking in the case of Kosovo. On the one hand, Yugoslav
and Serbian authorities had not shown much <(commitment to democratic
practices ). On the other, the Albanian leadership saw autonomy as an
intermediate arrangement; their final objective remained inde-
pendence (275). In such a context, there were good reasons to be sceptical
about the chances of a political arrangement - even if one had been con-
cluded - being implemented. Therefore, the Contact Group always insisted
that the settlement should be guaranteed by an international military
force. The Rambouillet plan thus provided for the withdrawal of Yugoslav
and Serbian forces (except for 1500 border guards), and their replacement
by an international security force, to be constituted by NATO, as well as
a police corps to be established under the auspices of the OSCE. The plan
also provided for the demilitarisation of Albanian irregular forces.
The international presence appeared as the key element of the settlement
promoted at Rambouillet. It made it possible to combine the different
objectives pursued by the third-party states involved in the issue; stopping
the turmoil in the region, protecting the Albanian community but also
barring the independence of Kosovo and keeping the province, at least tem-
porarily, within the FRY. Yet, combined with an institutional organisation
which considerably restricted the powers of the Federal and Serbian
authorities in Kosovo, it amounted in practice to a suspension of FRY's
sovereignty over Kosovo. However, precisely by virtue of its sovereignty,
Yugoslavia was entitled to refuse to conclude such an agreement and to
oppose the presence of an international armed force that had not been
established by a Security Council resolution. Having failed to impose a
(273) A. LIJPHART, supra note 266, p. 1.
(274) Idem, p. 53.
(275) See, for instance, the declaration of Dr. Rugova, Belgrade, 11 March 1998 (Agence
Europe, no 7178, 12 March 1998) and of Dr. Fehmi Agani, member of the LDK, at the meeting
with European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights and the EP Delegation on rela-
tions with Southeast Europe (Brussels, 10 November 1998, Agence Europe, no 7341, 13 November
1998).
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solution by diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of air strikes, NATO
member states decided to carry out their threat and to unbolt by force
Yugoslavia's sovereignty over Kosovo (276).
B. - Kosovo Under International Protection
The NATO bombing campaign ended with the acceptance by the
Yugoslav authorities, on June 3 1999, of a peace deal providing for the
deployment of an international military and civil presence in Kosovo under
UN auspices. The framework of the mandate of international agents has
been set forth by the Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted
under Chapter VII (1). However, this resolution leaves open the question
of Kosovo's legal status (2).
1. The Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)
The most salient difference between the Rambouillet text and the plan
accepted by the Serbian authorities after the NATO bombing, lies in the
major role the latter attributes to the UN. This plan, indeed, provides that
the administration of Kosovo will not be directly transferred to local
institutions, but rather will be exercised, for an indeterminate time, by the
United Nations (277). Moreover, the international security force con-
stituted by NATO (KFOR), as well as the international civil agents, are to
be deployed under the authority of the UN, for an initial period of 12
months, to continue until the Security Council decides otherwise.
Firstly, Resolution 1244 (1999) entrusts the UN Secretary-General with
the organisation of a United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK). The overall function of UNMIK is to < provide trans-
itional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for
a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo a (§ 10). The Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo, Bernard
(276) As stated in the introduction, this article does not consider the issue of the use of force
by NATO countries against Yugoslavia. On this issue, see, inter alia, B. SIMMA, <<NATO, the UN
and the Use of Force : Legal Aspects s, in E.J.I.L., vol. 10, 1999, no 1. In favour of the
emergence of a right to humanitarian intervention, see A. CASSESE, # Ex iniuria ius oritur : Are
We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in
the World Community? s, ibidem. For a range of different views on the NATO intervention, see
A.J.I.L., 1999, vol. 93, no 4, pp. 824-863, with the contributions of Ch.M. CHINKIN, J.I. CHAR-
NEY, R.A. FALK, T.M. FRANCK, L. HENKIN, W.M. REISMAN and R. WEDGWOOD.
(277) Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, Art. I (Text of the
agreement in Keesing's, June 1999, pp. 43008-10). In the Rambouillet draft agreement, the
Security Council was only invited to adopt a resolution # endorsing and adopting the
arrangements set forth in this Chapter, including the establishment of a multinational military
implementation force in Kosovo)) (Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,
Chapter VII, Art. I, § 1 (a)).
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Kouchner, has ( overall authority to manage the Mission and co-ordinate
the activities of all United Nations agencies and other international
organisations operating as part of UNMIK # (278).
Secondly, the Security Council <<authorises Member States and relevant
international organisations to establish the international security presence
in Kosovo [...] with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities # (§ 7).
The role of the KFOR, as described in Resolution 1244 (1999), consists in
establishing < a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons
can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a
transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can
be delivered # (Q 9). Confirming the military agreement between the NATO
allies and Yugoslav authorities, Resolution 1244 (1999) provides that the
KFOR is allowed to take such actions as required, including the use of
necessary force in self-defence, < to ensure compliance with this agreement >
and < to contribute to a secure environment ) (279). In accordance with § 3
of Resolution 1244 (1999), the FRY has withdrawn all its military, police
and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, while an international force has been
deployed. The KFOR has reached an arrangement with the KLA (UCK in
Albanian) on June 21, 1999, providing for its demilitarisation (280).
The present situation in Kosovo raises many issues that cannot be
developed in the framework of this article. Accordingly, the final section
concludes with a few observations on the role of the international
administration in Kosovo and on its action during its first months of opera-
tion. In particular, it seeks to highlight the tension between the official
international stance, according to which Kosovo remains part of
Yugoslavia until its final status is decided, and the legal as well as factual
evolution on the ground.
2. The Present Status of Kosovo : a New Form of 'Internationalised
Territory' or the Path to Independence?
It can first be noted that the policy of Western states which, rather than
recognising the self-proclaimed 'State of Kosovo', preferred to intervene
militarily to force the President Milosevic to accept their plan, seems to
(278) The UN Secretary -General has divided the various responsibilities of the Mission into
four major components, each of which has been assigned to a different international agency : the
UN runs the Interim civil administration; the OSCE is tasked with the institution-building func-
tion (democratisation and governance, the conduct of elections, human rights monitoring and
police training); the United Nations High Commisionner for Refugees (UNHCR) monitors the
safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and the provision of humanitarian relief aid; and
the European Union leads the reconstruction (Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to § 10 of
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), 12 June 1999 S/1999/672; 12 July 1999, S/1999/779 and
16 September 1999, 8/1999/987).
(279) Military Technical Agreement, supra note 277, I, § 4 (b).
(280) Text in Keesing's, June 1999, pp. 43015-17.
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imply their rejection of a right to secede, even in extreme cases. Tradi-
tionally, secession is considered in international law as neither permitted,
nor prohibited, but rather as a mere question of fact (281). However, many
scholars have argued in favour of a right to secede as 4 a remedy of last
resort; if a State machinery turns itself into an apparatus of terror which
persecutes specific groups of the population, those groups cannot be held
obligated to remain loyally under the jurisdiction of that State ) (282). The
reasoning is based on the idea that when a specific group becomes the
target of flagrant violations of basic human rights, they should be allowed
to escape the authority of the oppressing state. In a world where every par-
cel of territory is under the jurisdiction of a state (with the exception of
the Antarctica), subtracting a population from the control of a sovereign
normally implies the creation of a new state. One could argue about
whether the situation in Kosovo met the conditions set for the application
of this theory. However, the important point is that, whilst claiming that
the scale of human rights violations was intolerable, Western states did not
support independence for Kosovo. Rather, they decided to displace by
force the exercise of sovereignty over the province by the FRY.
Certainly, Resolution 1244 (1999) reaffirms the < commitment of all Mem-
ber States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY*> and
their position in favour of < substantial autonomy and meaningful self-
administration for Kosovo s. Yet, according to the UN Secretary General's
interpretation of Resolution 1244 (1999), < [a]ll legislative and executive
powers, including the administration of the judiciary will [ ...] be vested in
UNMIK# (283). The Secretary-General's Special Representative is entitled
to issue legislative acts in the form of regulations, which < will remain in
force until repealed by UNMIK or suspended by rules issued by the
Kosovo Transitional Authority once it is established * (284). The interna-
tional presence thus guarantees the suspension of the authority of the FRY,
but also hinders its replacement by an alternative sovereignty for, until the
Kosovo's final status is determined, the ultimate civilian authority will be
(281) If secession proves effective, and if the new entity fulfils the general criteria for
statehood, it can be recognised by other states. See M. SHAW, International Law, supra note 68,
p. 157 and p. 355; R. HIGGINs, supra note 68, p. 125. For a thorough discussion of the issue of
secession in international law, see T. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 1, pp. 35-322.
(282) C. TOMUSCHAT, supra note 164, pp. 9-11. See also D. MURSWIEK, ((The Issue of a Right
to Secession - Reconsidered s, in Modern Law of Self-Determination, supra note 1, pp. 21-39;
A. CASSESE, 8supra note 1, pp. 359-360 and pp. 119-120; Hurst HANNUM, Autonomy, Sovereignty
and Self Determination, supra note 1, p. 504; T. CHRISTAKIs, supra note 1, pp. 295-315.
(283) Report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mis-
sion in Kosovo, 12 July 1999, S/1999/779, § 35. See also UNMIK Regulation no 1999/1, 25 July
1999, On the authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, Section 1, § 1. All the regulations
can be found on the UNMIK's website : < http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovol.htm >.
(284) Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 12 July 1999, § 41 and UNMIK
Regulation no 1999/1, Section 4.
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exercised by UN appointed agents, and not by independent local repre-
sentatives.
Placing a territory under international protection or administration is
not without precedent in history. On the contrary, James Crawford has
pointed out that ((a persistent form of organisation of territories disputed
between States on strategic or ethnic or other grounds has been the estab-
lishment of autonomous entities under a form of international protection,
supervision or guarantees ) (285). However, the UN administration in
Kosovo is designed to be only provisional. Resolution 1244 (1999) entrusts
the international civil mission with the responsibility to facilitate << a politi-
cal process designed to determine the future political status of Kosovo, tak-
ing into account the Rambouillet accords ) (286). It foresees that in a final
stage, the authority should be transferred, under the supervision of
UNMIK, < from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions estab-
lished under a political settlement ) (287). However, it does not provide any
further precision as to the modalities and the time of the negotiations of
this final settlement. Manifestly, the crucial question of Kosovo's final
status was left purposely indeterminate, in order to allow international
administrators the necessary time to rebuild the political structure of the
province on a democratic and multi-ethnic bases, in the hope that in a few
years time, nationalist passions would have calmed down so that com-
promises would be possible.
Nevertheless, the international presence did not suspend the battle over
the future status of Kosovo. In effect, the action of the UN administration
itself is creating a new legal and factual reality that will have an important
impact at the moment of the final decision. Certainly, the international
agents < maintain open channels of communication with the authorities of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)) (288). Resolution 1244 (1999) also
allows the return of an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel
to perform certain functions (liaison with the international agents, clearing
minefields, maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites and at key bor-
(285) J. CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1979, p. 160. Several systems of 'internationalised territories' were imagined at the end of the
first World War, such as the regime of the Memel Territory, the Free City of Danzig or the Saar
Territory. The latter, in particular, was directly governed by the League of Nations, from 1920
to 1935 (idem, pp. 160-169). See also H. HANNUM, supra note 1, pp. 375-406. James Crawford
makes it clear that although s such entities have been referred to generically as 'internationalised
territories' [...] there appears to be no legal - as distinct from political - concept of 'interna-
tionalised territory' - in fact the cases discussed vary considerably in nature and extent s. This
concept must be distinguished from the notion of protectorates which << involves a consensual
transaction [...] whereby the dependent entity surrenders to the protecting State or States at
least the conduct of its foreign relations, and in other cases responsibility for such relations
together with various rights of internal intervention, without being annexed by or formally
incorporated into the territory of the latter)) (J. CRAWFORD, op. cit., p. 187).
(286) § 11 (e).
(287) § 11 (f).
(288) Report of the UN Secretary -General on the UNMIK, 3 March 2000, 8/2000/177, § 16.
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der crossings). Accordingly, Belgrade's government has established a Com-
mittee for Co-operation with UNMIK in Pristina, the President of which
has regular meetings with senior representatives of UNMIK, KFOR and
other international agencies in Kosovo (289). However, Belgrade is
precluded from exercising any significant power in Kosovo. In practice, the
province is now ruled separately from the rest of the FRY. UNMIK has
started to set up institutions aimed at involving the local population in the
management of all aspects of life in Kosovo. New structures have been
established at various levels. Firstly the Kosovo Transitional Council
(KTC) (290), followed a few months later by the Interim Administrative
Council (IAC) and the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIA) (291).
UNMIK has also begun to prepare actively the organisation of municipal
elections, to be held in the course of the year 2000 (292). The population
of Kosovo will thereby get used to managing their own institutions, under
the supervision of the UN, but without any interference from
Belgrade (293).
Furthermore, the UN administration must face strong pressure from the
majority Albanian population to reinforce the de facto separation from the
FRY, by breaking off all legal links with the FRY. Despite the UNMIK
regulation n' 1 promulgating that the laws in force prior to 24 March 1999
shall continue to apply in Kosovo < insofar as they do not conflict with
internationally recognized human rights standards or with regulations
issued by the Special Representative # (294), Kosovar judges and
prosecutors have refused to apply Yugoslav and Serbian laws posterior to
(289) Ibidem. Within the framework of the Military-Technical Agreement, KFOR has also
created a Joint Implementation Commission, which liaises with the FRY's armed forces and the
KLA (Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 16 September 1999, § 25).
(290) Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 16 September 1999, S/1999/987, §§ 2
and 3.
(291) Report of the UN Secretary -General on the UNMIK, 3 March 2000, § 3. The composition,
procedures and powers of those structures have been set forth by UMNIK Regulation no 2000/1,
14 January 2000, On the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure. The IAC is entitled to
make recommendations to the Special Representative for amendments to the applicable law and
for new regulations (UMNIK Regulation no 2000/1, Section 3, § 3.1). The JIA has been divided
into administrative departments covering all aspects of public affairs, each of which is co-direc-
ted by an international and u local co-head (see the indicative list of departments, Annex to
UNMIK Regulation no 2000/1). Note that, under the agreement on the formation of the JIAS,
all parallel structures of executive, legislative or judicial nature, were required to be dissolved.
Accordingly, the LDK President, Dr Rugova, declared that all these structures had ceased to
exist on 31 January (Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 3 March 2000, § 12). The
parallel administrative bodies have been integrated into the JIAS (idem, § 13).
(292) UMNIK Regulation no 2000/1, 14 January 2000, Section 8: Report of the UN Secretary-
General on the UNMIK, 3 March 2000, § 10 and § 138.
(293) v State in embryo *, The Economist, 27 November 1999, pp. 36-37.
(294) Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 12 July 1999, § 36; UNMIK
Regulation no 1999/1, 25 July 1999, Section 3. A group of experts from the Council of Europe
has been tasked to review the major bodies of law applicable in Kosovo and to make recom-
mendations to bring the laws into line with international human rights standards (Reports of
Secretary-General, 16 September 1999, § 33).
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1989 (295). Eventually, a new regulation was passed stipulating that the
law applicable in Kosovo shall be, apart from the regulation promulgated
by the Special Representatives, the one in force in Kosovo on 22 March
1989 (296), and the drafting of a new penal code for Kosovo was
decided (297). By the same token, a regulation dated 2 September 1999
stipulates that, unless proven otherwise, any transaction passed in Kosovo
< shall be deemed to exist with regard to any foreign currency that is widely
accepted in the territory of Kosovo a (298), namely the Deutsche Mark. In
the words of Joly Dixon, the UN Deputy Special Representative in charge
of economic reconstruction in Kosovo, this regulation ( legally recognized
the Mark as the commonly used currency in Kosovo ). (299)
The official stance that Kosovo is still part of the FRY thus increasingly
appears to be a fiction. However, the most disturbing feature of the present
situation in the province, is the inability of KFOR and UNMIK to ensure
respect for fundamental human rights of vulnerable communities. The
UN's project of rebuilding a pluri-ethnic society is thwarted by a wave of
violence against all minority groups. Non-Albanian, primarily Serbs and
Roma, have been targets for continued discrimination, harassment,
intimidation, attacks and killings (300). Acts of violence also affect
< moderate Albanians and those who are openly critical of the current
violent environment ) (301). Consequently, tens of thousands of Serbs, but
also thousands of Roma have fled Kosovo. The Secretary-General noted in
July 1999 that ( the increasing number of incidents committed by Kosovo
Albanians against Kosovo Serbs [...] have prompted departures. This pro-
cess has now slowed down, but such cities as Prizren and Pec are practi-
(295) OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2d report of the Legal System Monitoring Section, Develop-
ment of the Kosovo Judicial System, 10 June through 15 December 1999. Available on the OSCE
website : < http://www.osce.org/kosovo >.
(296) UNMIK Regulation no 1999/24, 12 December 1999, On the law applicable in Kosovo,
Section 1, § 1. The Regulation provides that Yugoslav or Serbian laws posterior to this date, but
anterior to the 10 June 1999, are applicable only when the subject matter or situation is not
covered by the law in force in 1989 or, in criminal proceedings, when they are more favourable
to the defendant (Section 1, § 2 and 4). UNMIK Regulation no 1999/25 repeals Section 3 of
UNMIK Regulation no 1999/1 of 25 July 1999.
(297) Le Monde, 15 December 1999.
(298) Regulation no 1999/4, 2 September 1999, On the currency permitted to be used in Kosovo,
Section 1.
(299) Kosovo News, 3 September 1999 (UNMIK's website, see note 283). The UNMIK itself
has decided to use the DM in its books and accounts as well as for the payments of civil servants
(ibidem).
(300) Reports of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 12 July 1999, § 120; 16 September
1999, §§ 4, 10 and 46; 3 March 2000, §§ 49-56. See also the joint UNHCR/OSCE assessments of
the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo, released on the OSCE's website (see supra note 295)
and the Human Rights Watch's Report, Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo,
August 1999, Vollume 11, no 10(D), available on Internet : <www.hrw.org/reports/1999/
kosov2 >.
(301) 3d UNHOR/OSCE Report on the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo, 3 November
1999, § 1 (source : see supra note 295); Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK,
3 March 2000, § 60.
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cally deserted by Kosovo Serbs, and the towns of Mitrovica and Orahovac
are divided along ethnic lines * (302). This situation is aggravated by the
absence of a functioning impartial and independent judicial system (303).
Judges and prosecutors themselves have been the victim of threats,
intimidation and even violent attacks in the course of their duties which,
according to the Secretary-General, < has impacted strongly on their ability
to remain independent and has resulted in an inadequate response to the
needs of justice s (304).
Undoubtedly, efforts are being deployed by UNMIK to address these
problems. In particular, it endeavours to encourage the members of
minority groups to participate in the new institutions. These efforts seem
to have been successful in the case of the new local police service (KPS)
developed by the UNMIK and the OSCE, for it integrates a relatively sub-
stantial number of Serbs and member of other minorities (305). By con-
trast, despite the fact that the UNMIK Regulation organising the Kosovo
Joint Interim Administrative Structure stipulates that ((all communities of
Kosovo shall be involved in the provisional administrative manage-
ment > (306), as at early March 2000, the Special Representative has not
managed to secure the participation of Kosovo Serb representatives in the
administrative structures (307). Additionally, the number of minority mem-
bers appointed as judges and prosecutors remains poor (308).
(302) Reports of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 12 July 1999, § 5. The 4th
UNHOR/OSCE Report on the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo (source : see supra,
note 295), covering November 1999 through January 2000, concludes that although <<serious
crime rates have decreased from level recorded in the previous minority reports, they remain
unacceptably high and indicate that ethnically motivated crime continues on a regular basis
across the province s. Similarly, the UN Secretary-General considers that <despite broad
downward trends, the level and nature of violence in Kosovo, especially against vulnerable
minorities, remains unacceptable s (Report of the UN Secretary- General on the UNMIK,
3 March 2000, § 152).
(303) 4th UNHOR/OSCE Report on the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo, § 16.
(304) Report of the UN Secretary-General on UNMIK, 3 March 2000, § 109. See also the OSCE
Legal System Monitoring Section's Report on the Development of the Kosovo Judicial System
(supra note 295). The latter report also deplores the lack of multi-ethnic participation to the
judiciary.
(305) 4th UNHOR/OSCE Report on the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo, § 10. According
to the Secretary-General, the <<Kosovo Protection Service is one of the few multi-ethnic institu-
tions operating in Kosovo s (Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 3 March 2000,§ 45).
(306) UMNIK Regulation no 2000/1, 14 January 2000, On the Kosovo Joint Interim
Administrative Structure, Section I (d)). One seat of the Interim Administrative Council has been
reserved for a member of the Kosovo Serb minority and four of the 19 Administrative
Departments are to be co-headed by members of the minority communities.
(307) Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 3 March 2000, § 7. On the measures
taken to improve the security of minorities, see idem, § 57-59 and UNHOR /08E Report on the
situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo, 3 November 1999, § 33. The Special Representative has
also adopted a regulation under which speech which incites national, racial, religious or ethnic
hatred, discord or intolerance will be treated as a criminal offence. See UNMIK Regulation
no 2000/4, 1 February 2000, On the prohibition against inciting to national, racial, religious or
ethnic hatred, discord or intolerance.
(308) Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 3 March 2000, § 108.
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However, the major difficulty of the international administration, seems
to be the lack of co-operation from states. << UNMIK continues to struggle
to get a few thousand international police, and has a limited budget to
meet widespread costs of administering the province, or to properly repair
basic infrastructure ) (309). As at 1 March 2000, only half of the authorised
number of international police officers had been deployed (310). In conse-
quence, UNMIK does not have sufficient police forces to ensure the
security of minority groups. It also sorely lacks the financial resources
necessary for achieving its numerous essential tasks. The situation in
Kosovo is still volatile. Nothing is definitive. However, the risk is great
that, without more determinate support from foreign states, the UN
administration will not be able to impede the continuing of 'ethnicisation
des territoires' (311) which has been at work since the beginning of the
Yugoslav conflict. This would be a failure from the perspective of minority
rights as well as the right to self-determination properly understood, which
both postulate that persons belonging to different communities can live in
the same territory and share a common citizenship.
CONCLUSION
The international reactions towards the Kosovo question demonstrates
that so long as the situation does not threaten regional stability, states will
remain reluctant to support a special political status for an ethnic group
in another state, even if members of that group are victims of discrimina-
tion and human rights violations. Fearful of encouraging the independence
claims of Kosovar Albanian, foreign states waited until the conflict reached
an extreme degree of violence, before they involved themselves meaning-
fully in the search for a settlement. However, the tardy response allowed
for an escalation of violence that strengthened the influence of the most
radical movements, leaving little room for compromise.
Autonomy for Kosovo appears to have been promoted more as a measure
to restore stability in the region than as a recognised right of the Kosovar
population. This is consistent with a more general trend, at least among
OSCE Member States, towards the acceptance that, in case of separatist
conflicts, the UN Security Council and a regional organisation such as the
OSCE are entitled to require the government concerned to grant some form
of regional autonmy as a means to restore peace and security. Yet, the
(309) 4th UNHOR/OSCE Report on the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo, executive sum-
mary.
(310) Report of the UN Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 3 March 2000, § 37. The Secretary-
General has appealed ((to all Member States to provide UNMIK, as a matter of urgency, with
the necessary number of UNMIK police officiers, special police units, international judges and
prosecutors, as well as penal experts)> (idem, § 154).
(311) B. BADIE, supra note 60, p. 196.
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overall picture of states' positions towards separatist conflicts in the OSCE
area suggests that such stance is normally conditioned to the initial accep-
tance by the state concerned of an international participation in the resolu-
tion of the conflict. The case of Kosovo is the only instance, among those
examined, in which the government concerned was required by foreign
states to implement autonomy despite its resistance to such international
involvement. Nevertheless, in all these cases, there was a notable consensus
among states that a government facing an internal conflict involving a
minority can be required to endeavour to settle it through negotiations.
This consensus can be construed as entailing the emergence of a customary
norm, according to which states would be under an obligation to settle
internal conflicts by peaceful means. Such an obligation would enable a link
to be drawn between the security perspective and concern for human
rights. An obligation to resolve conflicts involving minorities through
negotiations can, indeed, be associated with the right of minority members
to participate in public affairs, especially those affecting them. Moreover,
it relates to the right of peoples to internal self-determination, for such a
right entitles the population of the state to a political system allowing all
of its components to express their wishes, and thus to settle potential dis-
putes with the government through political accommodation, rather than
by recourse to force.
It follows that foreign states do not have to wait until the situation
degenerates into armed conflict; they are entitled at any moment to con-
demn a government which excludes a particular group from the political
system, and to require it to ensure that every community be able to take
part effectively in the running of public affairs. Moreover, they can urge a
government to respect all the internationally recognised rights of persons
belonging to national or ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities. If the
dialogue is refused and particularly, if the claims of the minority are met
with violations of human rights, foreign states could go further and support
more specific solutions to implement those rights. It is clear, though, that
international minority protection does not include a right to autonomy. An
overwhelming majority of states strongly refuse to be bound by an obliga-
tion in this respect. Nonetheless, international norms pertaining to
minorities do take into account, to a certain extent, the specific situation
of territorially concentrated minorities. Therefore, territorial autonomy
could be supported, in certain circumstances, as a particularly appropriate
means of implementing the rights of persons belonging to minorities.
On a different note, the Kosovo episode illustrates the persistent tension
between the democratic and the nationalist interpretations of the concepts
of minority rights and self-determination. This tension reflects the
ambiguity of the ideology of 'national emancipation' itself, from which
these concepts stem. Minority rights and self-determination can both be
invoked to legitimise political projects pointing in totally opposite direc-
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tions : on the one hand, a democratic society which recognises and
integrates cultural differences, on the other, the confinement of individuals
into isolated communities. It is submitted that the cause of human rights
and international peace would be better served by consolidating and
developing the presently accepted legal definition of these concepts, rather
than by adopting an ethnic definition of the 'people', or establishing a
general right to territorial autonomy for minorities. Indeed, self-determina-
tion of peoples in its internal, democratic dimension, needs to be reinforced,
while the core idea of minority rights - the possibility of distinguishing
cultural identity from citizenship - retains all its importance today.
However, each concept can influence and balance the other. Both would
gain from a constructive and dynamic interaction between themselves.
While the territorial conception of 'people' is a unifying principle, which
encompasses all the different groups living in the state, the notion of
minority underlines the diversity of such populations. Conversely, the
notion of people tempers the risk of isolation of communities, by fostering
relationships, exchanges and solidarity among individuals and groups living
in the same state. It enhances the unfolding of multiple identities. On the
other hand, minorities often transcend the frontiers of the state and may
create a link with the people of other states. Evidently, divisions and con-
flicts between groups will not disappear. Internal self-determination does
provide, however a framework for an institutional dialogue, which may
lead to constitutional changes designed to accommodate the aspirations of
the different communities within the state.
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